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Strutin: Preserving Attorney-Client Confidentiality at the Cost of Another

PRESERVING ATTORNEY-CLIENT
CONFIDENTIALITY AT THE COST
OF ANOTHER'S INNOCENCE:
A SYSTEMIC APPROACH
By Ken Strutin'
ABSTRACT

When a client admits to her lawyer that she is responsible for a
crime that someone else has been charged with, it alters the geometry
of the attorney-client relationship. A third party has now entered the
room triangulating the lawyer's responsibilities to her client, to the
innocent party and to the justice system. The idea of revealing a client's private confession is anathema to lawyers trained to carefully
guard their clients' secrets. Fidelity to the client, preservation of confidences, and the right to counsel strongly militate in favor of nondisclosure. On the other hand, an innocent person is facing a wrongful
prosecution, incarceration and, in some cases, execution. The pressures to protect the confessing client while at the same time preventing harm to a nonclient from a wrongful conviction are at the heart of
a complex ethical and practical conundrum.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct allow discretionary
disclosure where the lawyer believes that a third party faces "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." And two states have
gone so far as to expressly include "wrongful incarceration" in their
exceptions to confidentiality. This Article will look at the ethical
pathways and the multilayered constitutional and evidentiary analyses
in assessing the propriety, necessity and method of disclosure. Other
options will be considered that might avoid forcing an attorney to
choose between client loyalty and confidentiality or preserving an innocent nonclient from substantial harm, such as transactional immunity for the confessor. Lastly, a review of the implications for the
adjudication of innocence claims and systemic reform will be conducted, along with an examination of the constitutional imperatives
surrounding the attorney-client and attorney-justice relationships.
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INTRODUCTION

Nearly every Perry Mason case ended with the true culprit tearfully
admitting guilt on the witness stand 2-it was the DNA exoneration of
its time.' Innocent people have been and are being convicted of
crimes based on evidence that might later be found to have been
faulty for one reason or another. But as the DNA cases have demonstrated, appeals and post-conviction motions are not sufficient safeguards.' Since unequivocal and credible admissions of responsibility
are the cornerstones of many prosecutions,' it stands to reason that
the persuasive confessions of alternate suspects offered by the defense
2. See, e.g., Devine v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744 n.4 (S.D.
Miss. 1999) ("Popular lawyer television series of yesteryear starring defense lawyer
Perry Mason who, skilled in the art of cross-examination, managed to exonerate his
falsely accused clients by the show's end when either the true murderer or his/her
accomplice would confess from the witness stand."). See generally Francis M. Nevins,
Samurai at Law: The World of Erle Stanley Gardner, 24 LEGAL STUD. F. 43 (2000)
(describing the evolution of the Perry Mason approach to practice and his staunch
dedication to exonerating his clients).
3. Wrongful convictions brought to light through DNA exonerations have enabled scholars and practitioners to uncover multiple causes at the root of the problem,
e.g., false confessions, faulty forensic analyses, and problematic eyewitness identifications. See generally Ken Strutin, DNA Post-Conviction Resources, LLRX.com (Sept.
14, 2008), http://www.llrx.com/features/dnapostconviction.htm; Ken Strutin, Wrongful
Conviction and Innocence Resources on the Internet, LLRX.com (June 10, 2006),
http://www.llrx.com/features/wrongfulconviction.htm.
4. Non-DNA based convictions are more difficult to undo without a gold standard forensic test to contradict the jury's findings. See Glenn A. Garber & Angharad
Vaughan, Actual-Innocence Policy, Non-DNA Innocence Claims, N.Y. L.J. Apr. 4,
2008 at 4, col. 4 (stating that the lessons drawn from DNA exonerations should inspire
the serious evaluation of "actual innocence" or free standing innocence claims by the
courts).
5. "[T]rue confessions contain valuable information about the crime, its circumstances, and perpetrators, which assist law enforcement officials in their investigations. Thus, the confession has justly earned its title 'the queen of evidence."' Talia
Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 871,
872 (2008) (stating that overuse of confessions, which increase the risk of wrongful
prosecutions, might be remedied by the imposition of a penalty in the form of a sentence reduction as a disincentive against their central role in building a case).
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can serve as the basis for exonerations under the right circumstances.6
One likely source of these exonerating confessions is in the sanctuary
of the attorney-client relationship.
Criminal and civil attorneys sometimes struggle with a peculiar and
extremely difficult problem, namely, representing a client who has privately confessed to a crime for which someone else has been prosecuted. It applies to cases where the client has, in confidence, admitted
guilt regarding an unrelated criminal charge or in a matter where the
innocent person is their co-defendant.' The very utterance of a client's confession describing an uncharged crime or accepting principal
responsibility for actions in a joint offense changes the professional
dynamic for lawyer and defendant and creates a new putative party,
the innocent accused.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (The Rules) have
changed the landscape of attorney-client relationships by creating a
new exception to confidentiality. Under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) a lawyer may "reveal" or "use" confidential information "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." But how will this
rule inform counsel's conduct in the private confession case? What
degree of harm will justify disclosure? Does this scenario erode the
attorney-client relationship too far undermining the constitutional
right to counsel and due process for the private confessor?
The competing interests of preserving confidentiality and maintaining the attorney-client relationship are being tested against the ends of
justice. Arguably, a wrongful conviction should not stand regardless
of a third party's confession.' But in some instances, the "queen of
6. The confession to a crime that exonerates an accused does carry significant
weight based on its credibility and exclusion of the accused as the responsible party.
It also falls in line with other types of exculpating admissions, such as a recantation of
a prosecution witness' or alternate suspect evidence. See, e.g., In re Davis, No.
CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) (This death penalty case, remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing, involved an actual
innocence claim based on an alternate suspect theory, hearsay confession of another
and prosecution witness recantations. Id. "Mr. Davis also offers evidence to directly
prove his innocence, as opposed to simply diminishing the State's case. This evidence
includes: (1) hearsay confessions by Mr. Coles, (2) statements regarding Mr. Coles
conduct subsequent to the murder, (3) alternative eyewitness accounts, and (4) new
evidence regarding the physical evidence in this case." Id. at 57.).
7. See generally Ken Strutin, Wrongful Conviction and Attorney-Client Confidentiality, LLRX.com (Jan. 9, 2010), http://www.llrx.com/features/wrongfulconviction
confidentiality.htm.
8. See 250 Exonerated, Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, THE INNOCENCE PROJEcr (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Innocenceproject_250.pdf
(describing the first 250 people who have been exonerated through the efforts of the
Innocence Project and includes a statistical description of the principal causes for
their wrongful convictions); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 60 (2008) ("This study examines the trials, appeals, postconviction proceedings, and exonerations of the 200 convicts in the innocence group. First,
it identifies the crimes with which the exonerees were charged and what evidence
supported their convictions. All were convicted of rape or murder, and all but the
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evidence" may be the only decisive way to expose a defective prosecution.' The Rules raise additional problems about the knowledge and
responsibility of other participants in the process. For example what
are prosecutors' obligationso when they learn of a third party's admission in a proffer session," and should they offer a grant of immunity
to the confessor?
There are pragmatic issues too, such as whether the revelation is
reliable, and ultimately admissible. Are there alternatives to disclosure that can preserve attorney-client confidentiality? And how does
this affect the view of wrongful convictions and systemic shortcomings
in criminal defense work? Should the justice system rely on private
confessions to ferret out weak prosecutions? Will defense lawyers
have to Mirandize their own clients? Perhaps the better policies
would be to enlarge the jurisdiction of courts to hear actual innocence
claims, establish more Innocence Commissions to review live cases,
expand the right to counsel in post-conviction settings, and encourage
greater use of clemency and pardon powers by the executive branch.
And ultimately, it may be necessary to establish a practice of obtaining post-mortem releases from the confessor or seeking some legislative recognition of the right to transactional immunity for a living
defendant who wishes to exonerate another.12
nine who pleaded guilty were convicted after a trial. A few predictable types of unreliable or false evidence supported these convictions. The vast majority of the exonerees (79%) were convicted based on eyewitness testimony; we now know that all of
these eyewitnesses were incorrect. Fifty-seven percent were convicted based on forensic evidence, chiefly serological analysis and microscopic hair comparison. Eighteen percent were convicted based on informant testimony and 16% of exonerees
falsely confessed."); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, VIRGINIA LAw, http://
www.law.virginia.edu/html/librarysite/garrett-exonereedata.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2010) ("This library collection contains updated data regarding appellate and postconviction litigation by persons exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing.").
9. Cf Boaz Sangero, MirandaIs Not Enough: A New Justificationfor Demanding
"Strong Corroboration"to a Confession, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2791, 2794 (2007) ("At
least in the past, courts have tended to view the confession of an accused person
(extracted by police interrogators) as a trump card-namely, as very strong evidence
that is (and should be) enough to sustain a conviction. The reasoning was that a
voluntary confession is the result of the strongest feelings of guilt. Accordingly, the
confession has been crowned the 'queen of evidence."' (footnotes omitted)).
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2009) ("(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection
with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating
information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; . .. (h) When a prosecutor knows
of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor's
jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.").
11. See, e.g., People v. Ennis, 900 N.E.2d 915, 923 (N.Y. 2008) (stating that although not the central issue, the court expressed concern over the prosecutor's failure
to act on evidence from one co-defendant exculpating the other).
12. In practical terms, transactional immunity for a living defendant is equivalent
to a post-mortem revelation by his attorney, since the confessor is beyond prosecution
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Part II of this article will explore the boundaries of attorney-client
privilege and confidentiality by using a hypothetical based on a crime
from the early part of the last century" and then through notable
cases, such as Alton Logan, in our time. The permutations that can
arise when lawyers become privy to confessions in cases where no suspects have been charged; a former client makes the admission; and the
complicated tangles of co-defendant representation are reviewed in
Part III. In Part IV this article will take an in-depth look at a central
decision addressing the myriad ethical, evidentiary and practical issues
that arise in these situations. The efficacy of the posthumous revelation, where the confessing client is now deceased, will be considered
from an ethical and litigation standpoint in Part V. Then the metrics
of " reasonably certain death or substantial harm" will be scrutinized
as they factor into the attorney's decision to risk disclosure, as well as
other criteria for fulfilling their constitutional obligations to their own
clients in Part VI. Finally, in parts VII and VIII, the article will address the need for a systemic approach to resolve an ethical issue for
defense lawyers and the potential of transactional immunity as a
workable procedural remedy.
II.

PRIVATE CONFESSIONS

Oscar,14 a 19 year old man, walks into lawyer A's office seeking
representation. He is charged with petit larceny for stealing a Photostat of a newspaper from the public library archives. At his arraignment it was determined that he lacked the ability to hire a lawyer, so
the judge assigned attorney A to represent him. When Oscar arrived
at the lawyer's office, Attorney A had already reviewed the paper
work, including Oscar's unblemished rap sheet. As she begins discussing the matter with Oscar, Attorney A is sanguine about the outcome.
Oscar discloses that he stole the newspaper on impulse, the headline
was very disturbing and he felt strongly that he had to get rid of it.
The paper was dated March 2, 1932 and the banner read "Lindberg
Baby Kidnapped.""
in either circumstance. The difference is that an innocent person will not have to wait
until the guilty party dies to be exonerated. While totally immunizing a defendant for
a serious crime might seem extreme, it furthers the fundamental precept of preventing
wrongfully accused persons from being convicted and imprisoned, or executed. See 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358 ("Better that ten guilty persons escape
than that one innocent suffer."). See generally Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (discussing the implications surrounding the Blackstone
Ratio).
13. See Howard Chua-Eoan, Crimes of the Century: The Lindbergh Kidnapping,
TIME MAG. (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/2007/crimes/.
14. Oscar, in all his permutations, is a hypothetical character with a fictional connection to the Lindberg case. And at all times in this problem, MODEL RULES PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) will be the guidepost for Attorney A's actions.
15. Lindbergh Baby Kidnapped From Home of Parents on Farm Near Princeton;
Taken From His Crib, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,1932, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/
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Attorney A was perplexed at Oscar's story, why should this young
man have such a strong reaction to a news event that happened almost
80 years ago. Its relevance became clear when Oscar earnestly revealed that he had stolen the baby. Immediately, Attorney A rejected
this confession as incredible, and began harboring doubts about her
client's competency. From an ethical and practical standpoint, the
analysis was simple, Oscar was not capable of having actually committed this other crime. His confession lacked credibility or relevance to
a real time event or person.
Falsely confessing to newsworthy crimes, especially those drawing a
national audience, is a real phenomenon. Over two hundred people
confessed to the Lindbergh abduction, and more than 500 claimed involvement in the Black Dahlia murder.16 Attention and notoriety are
only a few reasons why someone might confess publicly or privately to
another's crime. In private, other motivations rise to the surface, such
as helping out someone else, a co-defendant with a long record or a
family member, etc.; to gain leverage in their own case by closing an
open investigation or to mount a psychological defense; the need to
unburden themselves, ease their conscience by confiding in their attorney; or, as in Oscar's case, there might be an underlying mental
health problem. In other words, a private confession to another's
crime may have complicated origins and goals, all of which weigh in
assessing its credibility. 7
Oscar's confession has to fall on the incredible side of the fence.
However, if Oscar had been 19 years old in 1932, and well into his 90's
today, his admission would begin to take on a new significance. As
Oscar's story unfolds, he reveals intimate details about the plot and
feels the need to clear his conscience before he leaves this earth. So
far, his confession lies within the confines of Attorney A's office, he
can rely on the injunction of Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6(b) to preserve a very credible secret.
section/learning/general/onthisday/big/0301_big.gif (listing the full headline that appeared in The New York Times).
16. See Miles Corwin, False Confessions and Tips Still Flow in Simpson Case, L.A.
Times, Mar. 25, 1996, at Al ("False confessions and dubious leads have been the
byproducts of high-profile cases since the 1932 kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby,
when about 250 people confessed to the crime." "[T]he 1947 Black Dahlia murder set
the record for crank leads, worthless phone calls and false confessions. In the years
after the slaying, more than 500 people confessed, some of whom were not even born
when the body of a 22-year-old actress named Elizabeth Short was found neatly cut in
half in a vacant lot.").
17. See Robert Kolker, "I Did It" Why Do People Confess to Crimes They Didn't
Commit?, NEW YORKER MAG., (Oct. 3, 2010), http://nymag.com/news/crimelaw/68715
("In recent years, the use of DNA evidence has allowed experts to identify false confessions in unprecedented and disturbing numbers. In the past two decades, researchers have documented some 250 instances of false confessions, many resulting in life
sentences and at least four in wrongful executions. Of the 259 DNA exonerations
tracked by a major advocacy group, 63 of them-or one out of every four-was found
to have involved a false confession.").
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Client-Lawyer Relationship

Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantialbodily
harm'

Its revelation would help no one living, and it might possibly put
Oscar at risk for prosecution or civil liability." While 19 year old Oscar's claim of culpability in the first crime of the century was implausible, 98 year old Oscar's credible admission was slightly more
impactful. Still, there was no concern over preventing "reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm," except to Oscar.
The most challenging circumstance, and the one facing lawyers today, would have been for the attorney who had represented a 19 year
old Oscar in March 1932 when the kidnapping occurred.2 0 This was
the time when everything was in play. Within three years, Bruno
Hauptmann would be arrested, indicted and put on trial for capital
murder. 21 During this time frame, Attorney A, representing our hypothetical Oscar, would have been in possession of knowledge gained
in confidence from her client that might have exonerated
Hauptmann.22
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009).
19. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-3 (2010) (indicating that New Jersey has no statute of limitations for murder). Still, the case against Oscar would likely be unprovable without his confession and corroborating evidence. The Hauptmann estate
might have a cause of action, but it too would be near impossible to prosecute. See,
e.g., Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351, 362-63 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Plaintiff [Anna
Hauptmann, widow of Bruno Hauptmann] seeks relief for alleged violations of both
her own and her late husband's civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and
1986; she also asserts pendent state law claims. Although the complaint, in its various
versions, is lengthy and diffuse, its gist is that Hauptmann was denied a fair trial and
suffered violations of his first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendment
rights.").
20. See generally Douglas 0. Linder, Famous American Trials: Richard

Hauptmann (Lindbergh Kidnapping) Trial 1935,

UNIV. Mo.-KAN. CITY SCH. LAW

(2000), http://www.law.umkc.edulfaculty/projects/ftrials/Hauptmann/Hauptmann.htm.
21. Douglas 0. Linder, The Bruno Hauptmann Trial: A Chronology, UNIV. Mo.KAN. CITY SCH. LAw (2000) [hereinafter Bruno Hauptmann Trial Chronology], http://
www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Hauptmann/chrono.html ("1934, Sept. 19
Bruno Richard Hauptmann is arrested for the crime. 1934, Sept. 24 Hauptmann arraigned before New York magistrate on extortion charge. 1934, Oct. 10 New Jersey
grand jury indicts Hauptmann on murder and kidnapping charges.").
22. See, e.g., Arthur J. W. Jones, Inmate #17966, Who Said the Lindbergh Case was
Solved?, N.J. Div. ARCHIVEs & RECORDS MGMT. (Sept. 25, 1956), http://www.nj
archives.org/links/guides/sintr003img24pl.html#top2.
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This is the crux of the problem for every attorney who hears a private
confession from their client that exculpates someone else. What
should Attorney A have done? She could waited and hoped that the
jury system would not convict an innocent man-all the while he was
sitting in jail and enduring the ignominy for the crime of the century.
And when a guilty verdict was returned,2 3 she could have chosen to
wait for the appeals court, possibly the U.S. Supreme Court, to correct
this injustice. 2 4 Even on the night of the scheduled execution, all appeals having been denied, Attorney A might have believed that the
Governor of New Jersey would grant a stay or even a pardon.2 5 Or
could she? This was the last, best chance she had to save an innocent
man's life, and correct an error of law.2 6 But she had to contend with
the duty to her client, who if believed might find himself in the hot
seat. Betray her client or save an innocent man? And at what point
would she have been justified in making the disclosure? On the day
Hauptmann was arrested? In the death house? And when would it
have been most effective in the long term? The longer she waited to
reveal the confession, the less impact it would have. Hauptmann
would have already lost the presumption of innocence, and all his appeals and writs and clemency applications were legally viewed as the
pleadings of a guilty man.
This hypothetical is not farfetched. There have been several cases
in which lawyers have had to do battle at the brink of ethics and conscience. And these troubling scenarios continue to multiply as clients,
attorneys, and society move into an age of extreme information sharing,27 and multiple defendant prosecutions.
First adopted in 1983, the ABA's Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) disclosure
exception applied to situations involving "imminent death or substan23. Bruno Hauptmann Trial Chronology, supra note 21 ("1935, Jan. 2 Hauptmann
trial begins in Flemington, New Jersey. 1935, Feb. 14 Hauptmann is convicted and
sentenced to death.").
24. Id. ("1935, June 20 Defense team appeals conviction to New Jersey's highest
tribunal. 1935, Oct. 9 The first appeal is denied. 1935, Oct. 15 Defense team files
second appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.... 1935, Dec. 9 Second appeal is rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court.").
25. Id. ("1935, Dec. 5 New Jersey Governor asks the New Jersey Court of Pardons
to grant Hauptmann a personal interview to assess clemency. ... 1936, Jan. 11 Court
of Pardons hears Hauptmann's plea and denies clemency. 1936, Jan. 16 Anna
Hauptmann appeals to New Jersey Governor for a stay; stay is granted. 1936, March
30 Court of Pardons hears Hauptman's plea a second time and denies clemency.").
26. Id. ("1936, April 3 Hauptman is executed.").
27. The social networking phenomena typify the innate human need to talk about
ourselves. Sharing incriminating revelations via YouTube, Twitter and Facebook have
already enlarged the scope of evidence collection and criminal prosecutions. Lawyerclient communications are bound to expand into social media, complicating questions
about confidentiality, attorney-client privilege and the discovery of incriminating evidence. See generally Ken Strutin, Emerging Legal Issues in Social Media: Part 1,
LLRX.com (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.llrx.com/features/legalissuessocialmedia.htm;
Ken Strutin, Emerging Legal Issues in Social Media: Part II, LLRX.com (Mar. 21,
2011), http://www.llrx.com/features/legalissuessocialmedia2.htm.
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tial bodily harm." 28 The comments set the bar very high in the context
of future crimes:
[12] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective
conduct that is criminal and likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b)(1), the lawyer
has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent
such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to
prevent homicide or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes is intended by a client. It is very difficult for a lawyer to
"know" when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out,
for the client may have a change of mind. 29
After the Ethics 2000 Commission, the disclosure language was
changed to "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm."
And the new comment adjusted the bar slightly:
[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule
requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is
subject to limited exceptions. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be
suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat
that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails
to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who
knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a
town's water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if
there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the
water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the
lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the
number of victims.30

The focus shifted from immediate harm to future victims to ameliorating damage based on past conduct that continues to pose a threat of
"substantial harm."3 1
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2001) (emphasis added)
("The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Comment, were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on August 2,
1983, and amended in 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000,
and 2002.").
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) cmt. (2001).
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) cmt. (2009)(emphasis
added).
31. See generally Patrick T. Casey & Richard S. Dennison, The Revision to ABA

Rule 1.6 and the Conflicting Duties of the Lawyer to Both the Client and Society, 16

J. LEGAL ETHICS 569, 571 (2003) ("Absent are the words 'criminal' and 'imminent,' which formerly made this exception more narrow. The new rule offers lawyers
wider latitude to decide whether to reveal information where others are in serious
danger. This greater latitude recognizing an 'overriding value of life and physical integrity' as compared with the value of strict lawyer-client confidentiality." (footnotes
omitted)).
GEO.
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The necessity and urgency of when to proceed will be affected by
whether the jurisdiction in which counsel is practicing or whose Rules
of Professional Conduct would be controlling has adopted a discretionary 32 or mandatory 33 version of Rule 1.6(b)(1). 34 For example, the
2006 amendment to Washington state's Rule 1.6 only makes one section mandatory:
(b) A lawyer to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to prevent the client from committing a crime[.13
The individual lawyer's conscience is the fulcrum in these compelling
and complex circumstances, and forcing a choice invokes the deepest
concerns over the preservation of the attorney-client relationship.3 6
32. See Brooks Holland, Confidentiality and Candor Under the 2006 Washington
Rules of Professional Conduct, 43 GONz. L. REV. 327, 343-44 (2008) ("Model Rule
1.6(b)(1)'s permissive authorization represents the majority rule, and reflects the
judgment that for disciplinary purposes, lawyers sit in the best position to evaluate
and counsel their clients, and to judge whether client confidentiality should yield to
individual safety interests." (footnotes omitted)).
33. Id. at 344 ("In surely the most controversial amendment to [Washington
State's] RPC 1.6, and perhaps to the RPC in their entirety, 2006 RPC 1.6(b)(1) dictates that '[a] lawyer to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . shall
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to prevent reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm.' This mandatory reporting duty to prevent
serious physical harm is the minority rule, currently present in only twelve other
states' ethical codes: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin." (footnotes
omitted)).
34. See generally Colin Miller, Ordeal By Innocence: Why There Should Be a
Wrongful Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102
Nw. U. L. REV. 391, 395 (2008) ("As the attached Appendix indicates, twenty-six
states have adopted some version of amended Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) while twentythree states and D.C. still have Rules that only permit or require attorney disclosures
to prevent future criminal (and sometimes fraudulent) conduct. Only five states still
have an 'imminence' requirement, and eleven states have adopted some form of the
1981 Proposed Final Draft Rule 1.6(b)(1) and permit or require attorneys to disclose
client information to prevent fraudulent acts, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another, or both. Only one state [Massachusetts], however, has
adopted some version of the 1979 discussion draft. Perhaps guided by its experience
with George Reissfelder, Massachusetts has a version of Rule 1.6(b)(1) which permits
a lawyer to disclose client information 'to prevent the commission of a criminal or
fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another, or to prevent the wrongful execution or incarcerationof another."' (footnotes
omitted)).
35. WASH.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(1)(2) (emphasis added), http://www.courts.wa.gov/court
rules/?fa=court rules.display&group=ga&set= RPC&ruleid= garpcl.06.
36. See Anne I. Seidel, Confidentiality Under the New Rules of Professional Conduct, WASH. STATE B. Ass'N NEWs (Sept. 2006), http://www.wsba.org/media/publica
tions/barnews/sept06-ethics.htm ("For the first time, Washington lawyers are not only
permitted, but are required, to disclose information obtained through representing a
client. Such information must be revealed 'to prevent reasonably certain death or
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The additional elements of professional liability or malpractice" and
possible disciplinary action are also heightened under a mandatory
scheme that implies immediate action by the attorney. It would also
directly impact the timing of the disclosure and evaluation of "substantial harm." Waiting until justice took its course in the hopes of a
dismissal or acquittal might not be feasible. The hill gets steeper the
further a criminal case proceeds up the ladder of post-conviction remedies in terms of the jurisdiction of the court3 9 and the position of the
substantial bodily harm.' Previously, a lawyer was permitted, but not required, to
reveal confidential information to prevent a client from committing a crime. Although not included in the Model Rules, 13 other states currently have similar
mandatory disclosure rules. The rule does not specify to whom the disclosure must be
made, e.g., is it sufficient to report a death threat to the police, or does the lawyer also
need to contact the victim? Given the mandatory nature of the rule and the lack of
any qualifying language, it appears that a lawyer must disclose the information to
everyone necessary to prevent death or substantial bodily harm.").
37. See, e.g., Scher v. Sindel, 837 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)(The inmate
in this case filed a lawsuit against his retained attorney for legal malpractice based,
among other things, on claims that he "(3) violated appellant's attorney-client privilege by disclosure of appellant's confidential records to the postal inspection service;
(4) violated appellant's attorney-client privilege by contacting the attorney general's
office resulting in appellant's placement into indefinite punitive segregation (5) violated appellant's attorney-client privilege by discussing appellant's confidential matters with his former girlfriend Georganne Baker; (6) violated the attorney-client
privilege by contacting the parole board's chairman and disclosing confidential matters about appellant to the board; and (7) violated the attorney-client privilege by
testifying in open court against appellant in a federal case appellant had filed." Id.).
38. Cf Sarah Buel & Margaret Drew, Do Ask and Do Tell: Rethinking the Lawyer's Duty to Warn in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 447, 495-96 ("Notwithstanding the social utility of maintaining confidential client relationships, it must
be recognized that there is greater public benefit from providing immediate assistance
to prevent harm to a third party, particularly a readily identifiable abuse victim. Lawyers ranging from in-house counsel for large manufacturing companies and corporate
litigators to criminal and family law practitioners are uniquely positioned to determine their clients' plans due to the interview and investigation process inherent in
representation. As our doctrinal, normative, and policy arguments indicate, it is inexcusable to permit continuing legal impunity for lawyers who fail to screen and attempt
to dissuade potentially violent clients, and to warn the intended victims. Should jurisdictions wish to encourage client disclosures in the interests of individual and public
safety, consideration must be given to statutory tort immunity for those lawyers who
make good faith disclosures in the interests of preventing serious harm, including
criminal acts. Given the astonishing levels of dangerous, criminal, recidivist behavior
by domestic violence offenders, lawyers must take their place among the many professionals required to provide warning to their anticipated victims.").
39. The reasonable doubt standard at trial is based on a presumption of innocence
that evaporates upon a guilty verdict; and actual innocence claims are the most difficult to litigate. A free standing innocence claim as a basis for post-conviction relief,
unaccompanied by constitutional error, has yet to be endorsed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) ("We may assume, for the
sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue
open to process such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and
the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would
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prosecution. 4 0 At the same time, it could wreck the course of the confessing client's principal case.4 1 Where should the disclosure line be
drawn?
Notably, many of the precedents in this area were created by attorneys acting under the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility or
some personal interpretation of the lawyer's oath. The guiding principle of DR 4-101 enjoined attorneys against revealing confidences or
secrets imparted by their clients unless she learned: "The intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." Of course, this begs the question of whether the
wrongful prosecution, conviction, or punishment (including capital
punishment)4 2 of an innocent person qualifies as a "crime." 43 Under
place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The showing made by petitioner in this case falls far short
of any such threshold."). See generally Sarah A. Mourer, Gateway to Justice: Constitutional Claims to Actual Innocence, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1279 (2010) ("Blind faith in
the justice system might lead one to assume that a trial in which constitutional rights
are preserved would necessarily result in a just verdict. In other words, if a court
protects the accused's constitutional rights, then no innocent man will ever be wrongly
convicted. As a result of new technology (especially DNA testing), however, it is well
recognized that innocent men and women are recurrently incarcerated and convicted
even in the absence of factual or constitutional error. For the first time in history, the
Supreme Court of the United States has come close to recognizing this reality.").
40. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to
Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 127-28 (2004) ("[C]onduct
by prosecutors can have a negative impact on the outcome of post-conviction innocence claims. First, in the post-conviction DNA testing context, the prosecution can
affect the availability of this option by opposing the testing altogether or simply by
stalling in turning over the biological evidence sought by the defense, which is almost
invariably in the possession of law enforcement. Second, where post-conviction innocence claims are unrelated to DNA testing, such as those involving statements by
previously unknown witnesses or confessions by the actual perpetrator, the prosecution can influence how courts will resolve the claims by deciding whether to cooperate
with the defense, for instance, by joining - or at least not contesting - a defendant's
request for an evidentiary hearing based on the newly discovered evidence." (footnotes omitted)).
41. Inbal Hasbani, Comment, When the Law Preserves Injustice: Issues Raised by a
Wrongful Incarceration Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 277, 295-96 (2010) ("A mandatory disclosure rule that requires attorneys to immediately come forward with exonerating information could seriously
hurt a client's case. For -example, in the midst of a trial in which an attorney's own
client is being tried, the immediate disclosure rule would require the attorney to disclose potentially damning confidential information about his client in order to save an
innocent co-defendant from serving any time in prison. A rule that would require
such disclosure could violate a client's right against self incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
42. See In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24,
2010) ("[E]xecuting an innocent person would violate the United States Constitution
43. In a footnote to this section, the ABA cited an opinion defining the guidelines
for making the assessment that a crime has occurred: "16. ABA Opinion 314 (1965)
indicates that a lawyer must disclose even the confidences of his clients if 'the facts in
the attorney's possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed."' MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (C)(3) n. 16 (1983),
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the new Rules, the debate centers on the meaning of "substantial
harm. 44
The Rules of Professional Conduct and the attorney-client privilege
are guideposts for the behavior of lawyers earnestly representing their
clients. The conflicts arise when information is revealed, or discovered, that pits the interests of their clients against the welfare of an
innocent person. The balance between acceptable attorney conduct
and morally responsible action is the crux of the problem. 45 The scenarios in which this wrenching choice has arisen have usually involved
someone charged with a capital crime.
Alton Logan, along with Edgar Hope, had been arrested and
charged with murder, attempted murder and armed robbery for killing a security guard in a Chicago McDonalds in January of 1982.46
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/mcpr/MCPR.HTM. And to a lesser extent, the
DR 7-102(B)(1) concerning "fraud": "(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly
establishing that: (1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged communication." Id. (footnotes omitted).
44. Casey & Dennison, supra note 31, at 576-77 ("One of the major changes to
Rule 1.6 proposed by the Commission was that the language of Rule 1.6(b)(1) be
modified in order to expand the exception allowing for disclosure to prevent death or
bodily harm. The particular language used in the proposal is that disclosure is permitted 'to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.' This provision
departs from the previous rule in three ways. One, it eliminates some of the Rule's
text, including the word 'criminal' and thereby 'allow[s] disclosures in circumstances
of peril without a finding by the lawyer that the client conduct is a crime.' Two, the
new proposal would no longer require that the death or substantial bodily harm be
imminent. Finally, it enables a lawyer to disclose when 'reasonably certain' that death
or serious injury might result, as opposed to this harm having to be 'likely,' which was
required by the previous rule." (footnotes omitted)).
45. See, e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemmal ("Tanya and Cinque have
been arrested for robbing the Hibernia Savings Bank and placed in separate isolation
cells. Both care much more about their personal freedom than about the welfare of
their accomplice. A clever prosecutor makes the following offer to each. 'You may
choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent
I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does serious time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain silent, they will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two convictions,
but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent, I'll have to
settle for token sentences on firearms possession charges. If you wish to confess, you
must leave a note with the jailer before my return tomorrow morning.' The 'dilemma'
faced by the prisoners here is that, whatever the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for
each than the outcome they would have obtained had both remained silent."); Will M.
Bennis et al., The Costs and Benefits of Calculation and Moral Rules, 5 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. Sci. 187 (2010), http://pps.sagepub.com/content/5/2/187.full#aff-1 (discussing and analyzing the decision-making approaches to the "prisoner's dilemma"
problem).
46. See People v. Logan, 586 N.E.2d 679, 680, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)(The issue on
appeal concerned the improper admission of evidence regarding the victim's family.
Id. at 681. "[T]he failure of defendant's counsel to challenge the admission of evi-
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Three eyewitnesses claimed that he was the shooter. The prosecutor
asked for the death penalty. At the same time that Logan went to
trial, Andrew Wilson was facing charges in the shooting deaths of two
police officers.4 7 In the course of discussions with his attorneys, Dale
Coventry and Jamie Kunz, Wilson admitted that he had killed the security guard, not Alton Logan.4 8 In a news interview, years later, his
attorneys described Wilson's demeanor as he revealed his involvement in the other uncharged crime:
"He [Wilson] just about hugged himself and smiled. I mean he was
kind of gleeful about it. It was a very strange response," Jamie
Kunz said.
"How did you interpret that response?" Bob Simon [CBS correspondent] asked.
"That it was true and that he was tickled pink," Jamie Kunz said.
"He was pleased that the wrong guy had been charged. It was like a
game and he'd gotten away with something. But there was just no
doubt whatsoever that it was true. I mean I said, 'It was you with
the shotgun-you killed the guy?' And he said, 'Yes,' and then he
giggled," Dale Coventry added.49
Convinced of Wilson's sincerity, the two defense lawyers shared an
ethical and moral hot seat. An innocent man faced the death penalty
and they possessed exculpatory information that might set him free,
but it would mean putting their client's head on the chopping block.s0
dence and arguments concerning the victims' families was objectively unreasonable
and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the failure to raise the issue,
defendant's conviction and sentence would have been reversed." Id. at 685. The case
was remanded for a new trial. Id. at 686.).
47. Id. at 681 ("Prior to trial, the State and counsel for Hope filed motions in
limine to preclude defendant's counsel from eliciting evidence of a connection between Hope and Andrew and Jackie Wilson. The Wilsons have been convicted of
murdering Chicago police officers William Fahey and Richard O'Brien. The killings
occurred on February 9, 1982, and in a statement made at the time of his arrest, Jackie
Wilson claimed that a few hours before the killings, Andrew Wilson had devised a
plan to help his friend Edgar Hope escape from Cook County Hospital. Hope was
being held at the hospital in connection with murder of another Chicago police officer
that occurred on February 5, 1982. In response to these motions, defendant pointed
out that the shotgun used in the McDonald's robbery and the service revolvers belonging to Officers Fahey and O'Brien were discovered by the police in the beauty
shop where Andrew Wilson lived and worked and that the weapons were recovered
by the police when they went to the shop in an attempt to arrest the Wilsons for the
murders of Fahey and O'Brien. Defendant argued that it was his theory of defense
that one of the Wilson brothers, and not defendant, was involved in the robbery at the
McDonald's restaurant and, therefore, he should be allowed to show the connection
between Hope and the Wilsons." (footnotes omitted)).
48. Daniel Schorn, 26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man in Prison, CBS NEWS.COM
(May 25, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/06/60minutes/main3914719.
shtml.
49. Id.
50. Id. ("'The only thing we could have leaked is that Andrew Wilson confessed to
us. And how could we leak that to anybody without putting him in jeopardy?' Kunz
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After much research and thoughtful examination of the dilemma they
faced, the attorneys came up with a compromise:
Dale Coventry: "We wrote out an affidavit. We made an affidavit
that we had gotten information through privileged sources, that Alton Logan was not in fact guilty of killing the officer, that in fact
somebody else did it."
Jamie Kunz: "We wanted to put in writing, to memorialize, you
know, to get a notarized record of the fact that we had this information back then so that if, you know, 20 years later, 10 years later, if
something allowed us to talk, as we are now, we could at least we
we'd at least have an answer to someone who says, 'You're just
making this up now."' 5
They took the exonerating affidavit, sealed it inside an envelope, and
placed it in a lockbox under Dale Coventry's bed.5 2 And there it remained as Alton Logan went on trial in 1982. The envelope was not
opened when the jury returned a guilty verdict, nor were its contents
revealed when they voted ten to two to spare Logan's life. He narrowly avoided the death penalty only to serve life in prison.
If the jury had returned a death sentence, the seal would have been
broken. 54 But as Coventry and Kunz explained they had to remain
silent otherwise:
"So it's just okay to prevent his execution if necessary, but it was
not okay to prevent his going to prison for the rest of his life?" Bob
Simon asked.
"Morally there's very little difference and we were torn about that,
but in terms of the canons of ethics, there is a difference, you can
prevent a death," Dale Coventry replied.
replied. 'It may cause us to lose some sleep. But, but I lose more sleep if I put
Andrew Wilson's neck in the in the noose."').
51. Id.
52. Id. It should be noted that there was a third name on the affidavit, Marc
Miller, co-defendant Edgar Hope's attorney. Hope had confided in Miller that Alton
Logan was not present at the killing of the security guard. See Michael Miner, The
Greater of Two Evils: When Is it OK to Let an Innocent Man Rot in Jail?, CHICAGO
READER, Jan. 31, 2008, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/the-greater-of-twoevils/Content?oid=1212988.
53. Schorn, supra note 48 ("'It was a 10 to 2 vote. Ten for, two against. Two
individuals saved my life,' Logan explained.").
54. The exact timing of a disclosure might have been debatable, since death cases
take years before appeals are exhausted. See generally Time on Death Row, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row (last visited
Apr. 1, 2011) ("Death row inmates in the U.S. typically spend over a decade awaiting
execution. Some prisoners have been on death row for well over 20 years."). And it
was always possible that one of Logan's post-conviction motions might have succeeded or his sentence commuted. The attorneys could have chosen to wait until the
last possible moment, or chosen to act sooner depending on their view of the efficacy
of their information. Would an appellate tribunal or trial court judge been more sympathetic to this type of evidence than the governor on the night of the execution?
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"But the minute he was not sentenced to death, the minute he was
sentenced to life in prison, you decided to do nothing?" Bob Simon
asked.
"Yes," Jamie Kunz said. "I can't explain it. I don't know why that
made the difference but I know it did."55
At the heart of their conflict was the reality that helping Logan meant
setting up their client, Andrew Wilson, for a capital crime. The disclosure decision was also weighted down by the evidentiary problem.
Wilson's statement was shielded by the attorney-client privilege and it
was hearsay. He would not have been willing to waive the privilege or
come forward to testify against himself for Logan's sake.s" He
boasted to his attorneys on the assumption that no one would ever
find out what he had done.
Still, the defense lawyers would not let it rest there. They devised
another strategy, a post-mortem release. Jamie Kunz and Dale Coventry convinced Andrew Wilson to release them from their confidentiality obligation upon his death. In 2007 Wilson died and Logan was
still alive serving his life sentence. Coventry and Kunz opened the
lockbox and gave their statement to Logan's lawyer Harold Winston,
who used it to free Logan after twenty-six years in prison.57 Essentially, these lawyers created the first confession donor card-instead
of donating an organ, Wilson donated his guilt. Viewing their actions
in retrospect, Jamie Kunz commented: "There may be other attorneys
who have similar secrets that they're keeping. I don't wanna be too
defensive but what makes this case so different, is that Dale and I
came forward. And that Dale had the good sense to talk to Wilson
before his death. And get his permission. 'If you die, can we talk?'
Without that, we wouldn't be here today."58

III. TRIANGULAR ETHICS: ArrORNEY-CLIENTNONCLIENT RELATIONSHIPS
This case and the others like it point up the importance of the attorney-client dynamic. The fundamental relationship between defense
counsel and her client is founded on loyalty and confidentiality. It is
these twin pillars that are tested when there is the revelation or discovery of privileged information concerning another's innocence.
55. Schorn, supra note 48.
56. See id. (stating that Kunz and Coventry, Wilson's attorneys, had to convince
him to waive his privilege and Wilson only agreed to waive the attorney client privilege after his death). There might be scenarios where a co-defendant will decide to
take the full blame for a criminal act to exonerate another, if strongly motivated by
family ties or bonds of loyalty, but no such connection existed here.
57. Id. ("One month after this report had aired, the truth finally did set Alton
Logan free. A judge, citing the new evidence, threw out his conviction and released
Logan on just $1,000 bond. Illinois' attorney general will not appeal the ruling and is
deciding whether to retry Alton or to simply drop the charges.").
58. Schorn, supra note 48.
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And the entanglements can take on many forms, pitting attorney
against client, current client against former client, and defendant
against co-defendant.
An attorney, accompanied by his client James Cassas, had entered a
New York police precinct one morning to inquire about reports of
homicides, or attempted homicides, within the last 24 hours." It was
then that the attorney "informed the desk sergeant that there was a
problem at defendant's home and that a prompt police response was
necessary. The attorney accompanied the police to defendant's home
where the police found Jan Cassas dead in the master bedroom. The
attorney then returned to the precinct where defendant was waiting."6 0 Back at the stationhouse, the lawyer, with his client standing
beside him, informed the police: "I brought my client in to surrender.
I believe he shot his wife. You'll find the gun in the room. It will have
my client's prints on it." 6 1
At his murder trial, the defendant moved to suppress his previous
lawyer's admission of guilt. The trial judge found that Cassas attorney
was acting as his agent, and authorized to make statements including
admissions of guilt to the police on his behalf. The statements were
admitted through the testimony of a detective.6 2 And they provided
the principal evidence of guilt. The trial court's ruling was affirmed
on appeal. However, in the state's highest court, the judges took a
different view.
The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that Cassas' admission of
guilt could not be introduced in the prosecution's case in chief absent
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.6 3 The preservation of privilege, along with recognition of a defendant's right to retain decisionmaking authority over fundamental choices, such as his communicative rights (pleading, testifying, etc), compelled suppression of the attorney's statement to the police.6 4 The statement was offered as direct
evidence through the detective, defendant's former attorney had not
testified.6 5 Since there was no evidence in the record that privilege
59. People v. Cassas, 646 N.E.2d 449, 450 (1995).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 451. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("It is also recognized
that the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own
behalf, or take an appeal." (citations omitted)).
65. See generally Mitchell M. Simon, Discreet Disclosures: Should Lawyers Who
Disclose Confidential Information to Protect Third Parties Be Compelled to Testify
Against Their Clients?, 49 S. TEx. L. REV. 307 (2007) ("My research suggests two key
points: (1) Lawyers are reluctant to disclose client information even if necessary to
protect the interests of innocent third parties; and (2) A significant segment of those
who might reveal such information will be dissuaded if they can be compelled to testify against their client due to the disclosure. In light of this, I argue that courts and
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had been waived, it could not be presumed based on the law of
agency. "The fact that the attorney is the agent of the client-principal
does not alone equate to a waiver of this privilege. The specific authorization must come from defendant principal to attorney-agent to
constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege." 6 6
The Court of Appeals went on to add that nothing should have
been inferred by the jury from defendant's silence while standing next
to his attorney during the admission in the police station-admonishing the trial judge on the need for a cautionary jury instruction under
these circumstances. 67 The judgment was reversed, the suppression
motion granted and a new trial ordered.
If the lawyer's actions in Cassas had been prompted by the desire to
free an innocent third party suspected of the wife's murder, and he
had resolved the ethical Rule 1.6(1)(b) issues, the prosecution would
still have been confounded by the unusability of the statement. While
the admission might persuade a district attorney to forgo or at least
reconsider the prosecution of the innocent party, she could not proffer
the attorney's statement of his client's guilt in a prosecution against
the innocent defendant. It would have been embargoed by attorneyclient privilege, Fifth Amendment, and hearsay barriers. And if the
prosecutor chose to go forward with the case against the innocent
third party, the defense would also be unable to put the statement
before the jury without the confessing defendant's waiver of privilege
or taking the stand himself.
Two police officers on patrol in an unmarked car in the Bronx
claimed that they saw Juan Ortiz standing on the front stoop of a
building where he took a glassine envelope from a grey pouch and
gave it to another man. 68 The layout of the building stoop became an
issue at trial, and Ortiz's attorney went back to the scene to take pictures. While there he had been observed by a former client, John
Gonzalez. 69 Later on, Gonzalez visited the attorney at his office and
legislatures should not expand existing exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.");
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-456 (2010) (stating
that defense attorney cannot breach confidentiality unilaterally in response to prosecution request for information regarding ineffectiveness of counsel claim raised by
defendant).
66. Id. at 724.
67. Id. at 452 ("Although neither defendant nor his attorney testified at trial, the
trial court nevertheless was aware from the hearing testimony that defendant's silence
was at the instruction of his attorney. Although the proposition that defendant had
adopted by silence his attorney's admission was not explicitly put before the jury, the
jury nevertheless heard testimony from which it could have inferred that defendant's
silence was an adoption or corroboration of his attorney's assertions about him. Thus,
we conclude that the trial court was required to guard against the adverse inference
that silence might be used as evidence against the defendant and to give a curative
instruction." (citation omitted)).
68. People v. Ortiz, 564 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1990).
69. The Court of Appeals considered Gonzalez a former client. Id. at 632 n.1.
("In his testimony at the CPL 440.10 hearing, counsel was not entirely certain of his

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol17/iss4/6
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V17.I4.5

18

Strutin: Preserving Attorney-Client Confidentiality at the Cost of Another

2011]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

517

revealed that the drugs found on Ortiz belonged to him. Moreover,
he added that he had recognized the unmarked police car and then
advised Ortiz to leave. However, he cautioned that "if called to testify
and questioned about his confession, he would invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination.""o
Defense counsel chose to call his former client to the stand. "Gonzalez testified that, as a passerby at the arrest scene, he saw defendant
descending the steps, that he saw several other men closer to the bag
that contained the drugs, and that the other men ran or walked away
when the arresting officers pulled up in an unmarked car."" He also
stated, contrary to his private confession to the lawyer: "[H]e was near
the arrest scene because he had been playing ball down the street and
was on his way to buy soda."7 2 Gonzalez did not admit owning the
drugs. Ortiz was found guilty of felony drug possession.
In the post-conviction hearing, Ortiz's trial attorney testified that he
did not believe that there was a conflict of interest in calling former
client Gonzalez as a witness. His decision not to cross-examine him
about the omissions in his confession (or to take the stand to reveal
them) would not have been effective because the jury would not have
found it credible; and he did not want to violate his duty to preserve
Gonzalez's confidences, since he refused to retell his confession in
court." And the attorney discussed these strategic choices with Ortiz
beforehand.
Ortiz's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict
of interest were rejected by the trial and appellate courts. They found
no prejudice to the defendant because neither his counsel nor new
representation would have resolved the Fifth Amendment and attorney-client privilege claims of Gonzalez.7 4 This rationale was rejected
by the Court of Appeals. The core of the analysis was "whether the
potential conflict affected the conduct of the defense."s This configuration put defense counsel in a minefield. There was no approach
that he could have taken and still maintained undivided loyalty to his
present and former clients:
Here we [Court of Appeals] conclude that the potential conflict affected the conduct of the defense. Trial counsel's decision to call
Gonzalez as a defense witness was a product of the conflict. On one
relationship with Gonzalez at the time of trial, but did recall that he had no pending
or subsequent matters for Gonzalez. The trial court and Appellate Division treated
the relationship as one with a former client, and we proceed on that basis, nothing
that in this case the result is the same whether defendant was trial counsel's present or
former client.")
70. Id. at 632.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 633.
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hand, his duty to defendant required him to make what use he could
of Gonzalez's testimony to exculpate defendant, but on the other
hand, he was obligated to maintain Gonzalez's confidences and
secrets. He therefore put Gonzalez on the stand to exculpate defendant but in the process elicited false testimony. An attorney not
laboring under the conflict would not have made that choice. If unaware of Gonzalez's involvement, such an attorney obviously would
not have called Gonzalez to the stand. If aware of Gonzalez's involvement, the attorney could have made efforts to put the facts
before the jury. Indeed, defense counsel himself testified that an
attorney who represented only defendant could have subpoenaed
Gonzalez and the persons to whom the confession was made in an
effort to inform the jury of that confession. Whether or not those
efforts would have succeeded, it is clear that the conduct of the defense would have been different in the absence of trial counsel's
continuing professional responsibilities to Gonzalez. 7 6
Finding an irreconcilable conflict, the court reversed the judgment and
ordered a new trial.7 7
This entanglement would also confound the analysis under Rule
1.6(b)(1). The attorney who had represented the true confessor to the
crime and the innocent accused was in the worst position to act. Protecting the interests of the confessor inevitably destroyed his ability to
fully vindicate the innocent client. And it further painted the attorney
into a corner when confronted with false testimony by the guilty client. All of which was compounded by the evidentiary, constitutional
and statutory impediments to revealing the confession.
Ortiz demonstrates what can happen when the same attorney represents both parties in the confessor-innocent triangle and where only
one party has been charged with the actual crime. In People v. Ennis,7 the participants faced similar difficulties in representing co-defendants and failing to make the best use of an exculpatory confession
by one of the parties.
Sheldon Ennis, the defendant, and his brother Aaron along with
Keith Taylor were charged with conspiracy to sell drugs and assaulting
and attempting to murder rival drug dealers. In the first incident, a
pair of rival dealers was shot at by the Ennis brothers and possibly by
Taylor, resulting in charges of attempted murder. 7 9 In the second encounter with another pair of rivals, the Ennis brothers were indicted
76. Id. at 658.
77. The Court of Appeals recognized that there were serious issues with the use of
false testimony but focused its decision on the ineffectiveness of counsel claim. See
generally People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753 (2001) (addressing "a defense attorney's responsibilities when confronted with the dilemma that a client intends to commit perjury").
78. People v. Ennis, 900 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 2008).
79. Id. at 918 ("The police retrieved numerous discharged shells and casings from
the area of the shooting and, at trial, a ballistics expert testified that at least two and
probably more guns were involved.").
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for stabbing their victims.so Sheldon Ennis was convicted after trial
for conspiracy, based on his role in the drug selling operation, and
felony assault for the shooting and stabbing of the rival dealers.'
Before sentencing, Sheldon's trial attorney, David Cooper, made a
motion to set aside the verdict 8 2 for the shooting conviction due to a
Brady violation. His lawyer asserted that:
[D]uring the trial, he [David Cooper] learned that Aaron Ennis
[Sheldon's brother] had participated in a proffer session with the
District Attorney's office in which Aaron stated that he shot Billy
Moody and that defendant was not present at the shooting. The
People never turned over the statement as Brady material. Cooper
explained that he was told about the statement in confidence and
with the understanding that he would not disclose it until after the
trial concluded. He claimed that, if the People had timely provided
the Brady information, he would have sought a severance and a separate trial for defendant so that he could have called Aaron as a
witness. Having learned of the statement late in the trial, however,
Cooper contended there was no way he could get the statement
before the jury because Aaron would have invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if Cooper had tried
to call him as a witness at the joint trial.
The trial judge found that the defense attorney had possessed the exculpatory information at a time when he could have acted on it. While
the prosecutor's obligation under Brady was clear,8 4 defense counsel
did not pursue any remedies at the critical time, e.g., ex parte application to the court for relief." Instead, counsel waited until after the
jury returned its verdict to bring the motion. Therefore, the motion
was denied.
Later, Sheldon Ennis raised the Brady as well as an ineffectiveness
of counsel claims in a post-conviction motion. His former trial counsel took the opportunity in his affidavit to address the trial judge's
assumptions about his motivations:
[I]t was Aaron's attorney who told him that, in an attempt to enter
into a cooperation agreement with the People, Aaron stated that he
shot Billy Moody and that defendant was not involved in the shooting. Cooper [Sheldon's lawyer] averred that, because he had promised Aaron's attorney that he would not disclose this information
until the trial was over, he felt constrained not to alert the trial
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAw § 330.30(3) ("That new evidence has been discovered since the trial which could not have been produced by the defendant at the trial
even with due diligence on his part and which is of such character as to create a
probability that had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have
been more favorable to the defendant.").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 919.
85. Id.
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court. He further claimed that he had no "tactical or strategic reason" for his failure to act on the information during the trial.86
The court denied this motion as well. The Appeals court also rejected
these claims based on the same reasoning. They added that had the
district attorney met their Brady obligations, the evidence would have
been unusable, since the co-defendant would likely have asserted his
Fifth Amendment rights if called in a separate trial against Sheldon,
and the statements from the proffer session were inadmissible
hearsay. 7
The key issues for Sheldon Ennis on appeal were (1) a conflict of
interest created when his attorney promised the co-defendant's lawyer
not to use the proffer session exculpation until after trial; and (2) the
failure to take advantage of the information during trial. Neither argument swayed New York's highest court. The promise by Ennis's
trial lawyer to Aaron's attorney not to use the information was based
on subjective personal values." It lacked the objective weight of facts
found in cases where a former client or the lawyer might testify as a
witness. Defense counsel's "internal struggle" did not fit into that
category:
Many (perhaps most) attorneys would not have perceived any conflict; having learned information that they deemed useful to their
client, they presumably would have pursued one of several available
courses of action, including advising the trial court, ex parte and
without necessarily divulging their source, that they had reason to
believe there had been a proffer session in which exculpatory statements were made. For these lawyers, any personal concern stemming from the assurance of confidentiality would have been
outweighed by the professional obligation to pursue the interests of
a client who was on trial for serious offenses, including attempted
murder.89
Notwithstanding, the second prong of the conflict argument and the
ineffectiveness of counsel claim share something in common-measuring the value of the exculpatory evidence had it been used during
trial. If counsel had asked for a severance, Aaron's proffer statement
would still have been disallowed: (1) assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (2) the hearsay problem created by a witness testifying about it. 90
The Court of Appeals reiterated that the prosecution should have
disclosed the exculpatory statement of the co-defendant, 91 but absent
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 920. Cf United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A
joint defense agreement establishes an implied attorney-client relationship with the
co-defendant . . . .").
89. Ennis, 900 N.E.2d at 920.
90. Id.
91. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.8 (2009).
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a specific defense request for the information, its nondisclosure was
insufficient to grant relief.9 2 In other words, since Aaron's statement
could not have been put before the jury, the failure of the prosecution
to reveal it did not contribute to the verdict, i.e., the exculpatory statement's inadmissibility made it immaterial.9 3 The Brady problem was
only considered in view of the ineffectiveness claim, since there was
no objection made to preserve the nondisclosure issue during trial.94
The true picture of the prosecution's case might have forestalled a
destructive disclosure by a defendant's attorney. While there was an
agreement among defense counsel about the revelation of inculpatory/exculpatory information, the prosecution had the benefit of overseeing the entire case. From that perch, there were a few
opportunities to rectify this situation. If Aaron Ennis had been called
to the stand, the district attorney could have granted him use immunity. Or there could have been an ex parte hearing about the information that all the attorneys were already aware of, and the court could
have entertained a motion to dismiss or fashioned some other remedy
in the interests of justice." Other questions come to mind. Did the
lawyer representing Aaron Ennis (co-defendant) have any ethical obligation to reveal his client's admission under Rule 1.6(b)(1)? Did disclosing the information to co-counsel with a promise of post-trial
delay discharge his responsibility? Did co-counsel violate attorneyclient privilege, confidentiality?
Co-defendant cases are particularly ripe for these types of conflicts,
especially when the offense being charged is based on a presumption
92. Ennis, 900 N.E.2d at 922-23 ("While the People have an ongoing obligation to
turn over exculpatory information-and their failure to do so in this case cannot be
condoned-noncompliance with this requirement will not rise to the level of a Brady
violation unless the evidence was material which, in New York, turns on whether the
defense made a specific request for the information." (citing People v. Vilardi, 555
N.E.2d 915 (1990)).
93. Id. at 923 ("Here, defense counsel sought disclosure of all statements made by
participants in the crime that were exculpatory of defendant. As such, the People's
failure to turn over Aaron's statement would be material if there is a 'reasonable
possibility' that the nondisclosure contributed to the verdict. That standard is not met
because, had the statement been turned over, there would have been no avenue for
defense counsel to admit it into evidence, either in the joint trial of the Ennis brothers
or in a separate trial of defendant had severance been granted." (citation omitted)).
94. Id. at 922 n.2.
95. See N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAw § 210.20(1) (Consol. 1996) ("After arraignment
upon an indictment, the superior court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss
such indictment or any count thereof upon the ground that: . . . (i) Dismissal is required in the interest of justice, pursuant to section 210.40"); id. § 210.40(1) ("An
indictment or any count thereof may be dismissed in furtherance of justice, as provided in paragraph (i) of subdivision one of section 210.20, when, even though there
may be no basis for dismissal as a matter of law upon any ground specified in
paragraphs (a) through (h) of said subdivision one of section 210.20, such dismissal is
required as a matter of judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling factor,
consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of
the defendant upon such indictment or count would constitute or result in injustice.").
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of possession. In People v. Nixon96 the defendant-driver had been
charged, along with the co-defendant passenger, with possession of a
weapon. The police had discovered a handgun under the passenger
seat during a vehicular stop. In his severance motion, the defendant
pointed an accusing finger at the passenger claiming that he was in
sole possession of the gun. At the same time, the co-defendant asserted that it was the defendant's weapon, and he had stashed it under
the passenger seat when the police stopped the car. Moreover, the
defendant argued that allowing them to be tried together would put
the co-defendant's attorney into the role of a "second prosecutor."'
And this fear was borne out by co-counsel's "aggressive adversarial
stance" during trial. Both defendants ended up blaming each otherit became an all-or-nothing theory of defense. The Appellate Division
found that there was an "irreconcilable conflict" between the two defenses, painting the jury into a corner and compelling them to "infer"
defendant's guilt, and acquit the co-defendant. A severance should
have been granted, and so a new trial was ordered.
The "second prosecutor" concept in Nixon brings out the complexity and ethical quandaries facing attorneys in joint prosecutions that
are really zero-sum situations. In a larger sense, whenever a client
confesses to her lawyer and takes sole responsibility for a crime, either
in a joint offense or in an unrelated case, the defense attorney's role is
enlarged. In the immediacy of the situation in Nixon, it grew into a
"second prosecutor" role. More abstractly from the distance of a case
where someone else is under law-enforcement scrutiny, and the client
is not charged, the attorney's motivation to do justice pits her against
her client's best interests. This intra attorney-client conflict can refashion defense counsel into a prosecutor for the purpose of prevent96. People v. Nixon, 908 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (App. Div. 2010).
97. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The burden of overcoming any individual defendant's presumption of innocence, by proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rests solely on the shoulders of the
prosecutor. Joinder is problematic in cases involving mutually antagonistic defenses
because it may operate to reduce the burden on the prosecutor, in two general ways.
First, joinder may introduce what is in effect a second prosecutor into a case, by turning each codefendant into the other's most forceful adversary. Second, joinder may
invite a jury confronted with two defendants, at least one of whom is almost certainly
guilty, to convict the defendant who appears the more guilty of the two regardless of
whether the prosecutor has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to that particular defendant. Though the Court is surely correct that this second risk may be minimized by careful instructions insisting on separate consideration of the evidence as to
each codefendant, the danger will remain relevant to the prejudice inquiry in some
cases.") (footnotes omitted); see also People v. Cardwell, 580 N.E.2d 753, 754 (N.Y.
1991) ("While no one factor is dispositive in such matters, we note that in this case
McCoy's attorney took an aggressive adversarial stance against both Goss and Cardwell, in effect becoming a second prosecutor. Goss' attorney then responded by attempting to impeach McCoy's story with evidence of a recantation, which elicited an
assertion from McCoy that the recantation had been induced by Cardwell's
threats-damaging evidence elicited not by the People, but by a co-defendant.").
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ing harm to an innocent person-a conflict that goes to the heart of
client trust and confidence.98

IV.

"REMARKABLE CIRCUMSTANCES"

In nearly every case where a lawyer determines that disclosure of a
client's confession is the correct and necessary choice, there are the
three evidentiary hurdles: (1) attorney-client privilege; (2) Fifth
Amendment privilege; and (3) hearsay. Rigid application of these
rules without considering the costs to society and to the individual of
allowing a wrongful prosecution to go forward or a wrongful incarceration to continue can be detrimental to the innocent and the administration of justice. 99 The story of Jose Morales and Ruben Montalvo is
riddled with living and post-mortem confessions, constitutional and
evidentiary conundrums, and offers a look at the intricate and interwoven problems of undoing an unjust conviction.
Jose Antonio Rivera was killed in the Bronx after he was surrounded by group of teenagers seeking revenge.1 00 Among the witnesses were Rivera's wife and son. Mrs. Rivera would later identify
Jose Morales as one of the assailants.10 ' Morales along with Ruben
Montalvo and Peter Ramirez were indicted for the death of Rivera.
Morales and Montalvo were ultimately convicted of second-degree
98. Another facet of this problem occurs when defense counsel is confronted by
an unrepresented co-defendant who confesses to her and takes sole responsibility for
the indictment against the defendant, or whom she believes is solely responsible and
needs to be investigated. See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 642 (2d
Cir. 1995) (noting that Attorney Robert M. Simels, appealed from the decision of a
federal grievance committee that sanction him with censure for contacting a represented witness: "The Committee found that Simels violated Disciplinary Rule 7104(A)(1) ('DR 7-104(A)(1)' or 'Rule') [no contact rule] of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility ('Code') when he contacted one Aaron
Harper, whom Simels knew to be represented by counsel. Harper had been charged
with participating in the attempted murder of a government witness in a drug conspiracy trial in which Simels' client, Brooks Davis, was a defendant, had agreed to cooperate with the government and had implicated Davis in the shooting. Prior to Simels'
contact with Harper, the government had informed Davis (and Simels) that it would
be filing a complaint against Davis and two other codefendants in connection with the
attempted murder of the government witness. Because in our view the Committee
erroneously interpreted DR 7-104(A)(1), we reverse."). A lawyer's obligations to
nonclients in the larger universe outside the confines of the attorney-client relationship is at the crux of the issue. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana Remus
Irwin, Toward a Revised 4.2 No-Contact Rule, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 797, 798-99 (2009)
("Our thesis is that as now written, Rule 4.2 is overbroad and ambiguous in important
respects. There is a strong argument that the Rule should be repealed and its work
done by Rule 4.3 -- that is, a lawyer should not present himself to a nonclient as
disinterested, should not give legal advice (except to consult another lawyer), and
should not negotiate with a person he knows to be represented.").
99. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ("[Wlhere constitutional
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may
not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.").
100. Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710-11, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
101. Id. at 710-11.
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murder; Peter Ramirez had killed himself before trial while playing

Russian Roulette. 10 2
A.

Fornes's Confession

Before sentencing, another neighborhood teenager, Jesus Fornes
had spoken with a Roman Catholic Priest, Father Towle, to unburden
himself and seek advice about what he should do:
Fornes told him [Father Towle] that he was upset because two members of his group had been convicted of a murder, that the two were
not present at the scene and were not involved, and that he and two
others had actually committed the murder. Fornes said that one of
the other two individuals was Peter Ramirez. He told Towle that he
and the other two used a baseball bat and a knife to take Rivera's
life. 10 3
The priest encouraged Fornes to come forward, confess and accept
responsibility.' 0 4 The teenager repeated his confession to Montalvo's
mother, who relayed it to Morales's mother, and eventually it filtered
down to the lawyers representing both defendants.'
On the sentencing date, Morales's new attorney, retained for the appeal, met with
Fornes to get his statement.1 0 6 He asked the court to adjourn the sentence to allow a motion to set aside the verdict based on newly discovered evidence. Meanwhile Fornes decided to seek legal counsel of his
own.
Fornes, along with Father Towle, met with an attorney from the
Bronx Legal Aid Society and explained his predicament. He informed his lawyer that he resisted coming forward sooner because he
believed that Morales and Montalvo would be acquitted, and he was
"surprised" when they weren't.' 0 7 The Legal Aid lawyer explained to
Fornes the ramifications of voluntarily coming forward and exculpating these men by admitting responsibility:
I said, look, you are 17, 18 years old, you have your entire life ahead
of you.
If you feel guilt, you have the priest here, you can feel guilt with the
priest. It is not in ybur best interests to go any further. I recall
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10-11, 16 (1992)).
104. Id. at 711.
105. Id.
106. Id. ("Fornes gave Servino [Morales' attorney] the following account of the
murder: On the evening in question, Fornes happened upon Carlos Ocasio and Peter
Ramirez near Kelly Park. The three saw Rivera, his wife, and her son across the
street. When eye contact was made, Rivera pulled either a screwdriver or knife out of
his pocket. The three approached and Ocasio hit Rivera in the head and the back
with a baseball bat. After Rivera fell to the ground, his head split open, Fornes
picked up the bat and hit Rivera in the back. Ramirez then 'went crazy' and stabbed
Rivera, more than once." (citing Keeney, 504 U.S. at 10-11, 16).
107. Id. at 713.
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to someone in

court that day ....

I said one of the problems that you have here is [that] by going
forward [you may] not end up clearing the gentlemen who have
been convicted ... but what you may end up doing is putting yourself in the middle of the case, you would end up being prosecuted,
the other two who you tell me didn't do anything would not necessarily end up being released ....
I just said I thought it was-he should not step forward, he should
not answer questions and he should invoke the Fifth
Amendment."os
Fornes lawyer counseled silence. After meeting with the prosecutor,
who believed that more than two people were responsible for Rivera's
death, his attorney was convinced that Fornes confession might be futile. A conviction had already been obtained and his admission would
not guarantee overturning it, while putting Fornes at risk for conviction as well.' 09 At the post-verdict hearing in 1989, Fornes invoked
the Fifth Amendment and remained silent. His statements never
came to light in front of a jury, and he was never charged with the
offense. Morales and Montalvo were sentenced to fifteen years to life
in prison.
When Fornes was killed in 1997, under circumstances unconnected
with the case, the primary records of his statements were in the minds
of his priest and lawyer. Nearly a dozen years later, the priest, Father
Towle, determined that his conversation with Jesus Fornes did not
constitute a "formal confession" protected by the seal of the confessional. 1 10 Father Towle provided Morales's attorney with an affidavit
reciting Fornes's admissions.
Other people tried to bring Fornes's confession into court. A postverdict hearing was held and everyone who heard his story had contributed directly or indirectly to the testimony presented:
Elizabeth Colon, Morales's mother, testified that on January 19,
1989, she received a phone call from Maria Montalvo, who told her
Jesus Fornes (also known as "Chuito") had come to her home, confessed his participation in the murder, and stated that neither
Morales nor Montalvo had been involved. Colon told her daughter,
Maria Morales-Fowler, to inform Servino [Morales's appeals
attorney].
Servino testified to the events of January 24, 1989, when he spoke
with Fornes at the courthouse prior to the scheduled sentencing.
Two other attorneys for the defendants, Peter Gersten and Herman
Rosen, testified as well. Gersten, counsel for Montalvo, testified
that Maria Montalvo had informed him during the trial that
"Chuito" was a witness to the murder, but he had not been able to
108. Id.
109. Id. at 713-14.
110. Id. at 714.
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locate him. Gersten further testified that he had not learned
"Chuito" was Fornes until on or before January 24th. Rosen, trial
counsel for Morales, also testified that he had never heard the name
of Fornes or "Chuito." Finally, Detective Walter Cullen of the
NYPD testified that he had interviewed Fornes the day after Rivera's murder and that Fornes had denied witnessing the crime. On
cross-examination, Detective Cullen also stated that the police had
interviewed a person who identified "Carlos" as one of Rivera's
assailants."'
The trial judge found Fornes's hearsay statements "uncorroborated
and untrustworthy" and therefore inadmissible in a new trial. Moreover, he did not think that a jury hearing that story would have rendered a more favorable verdict. The motion was denied.
B.

Ramirez's Confession

Before trial, an in limine hearing was held to consider the admissibility of statements made by Peter Ramirez, the third indictee who
died before trial, through the testimony of his mother and attorney.
According to Ramirez's mother, he had admitted stabbing the victim
and remembered later that neither Morales nor Montalvo were in the
park at the time of the killing.1 12 He revealed substantially the same
facts to his attorney, albeit in a slightly different account.1 13 However,
the trial court ruled out their statements, which were "all over the
place," in the absence of corroborating evidence.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction over claims that exclusion of Fornes's and Ramirez's confessions was prejudicial. After a
series of unsuccessful federal habeas corpus proceedings, again claiming error based on exclusion of the confessions, the case ended up
back in federal district court. Meanwhile, a separate state post-conviction motion had been filed on the grounds that Father Towle's revelation of Jesus Fornes's statement constituted newly discovered
evidence.' 1 4 An evidentiary hearing was held in federal court, where
Father Towle, the defendants' lawyers, and their mothers, all who
were privy to Fornes's admissions, testified. The key issue in federal
court was a due process violation because the state trial judge prohib111. Id. at 716-17.
112. Id. at 715.
113. Id. ("Ramirez's lawyer, Donald Yeoman, testified that Ramirez told him that
as Ramirez approached Rivera in the park, Rivera was on the ground injured with a
knife next to him. Yeoman further testified that Ramirez then picked up the knife, at
which point Jennifer Rodriguez jumped him from the back . . . . Ramirez struggled
with both Rivera and Rodriguez. During the scuffle, Ramirez stabbed Rivera. Ramirez gave his attorney a list of those who were part of the group in Kelly Park at the
time of the killing. Morales and Montalvo were not included in the list" (quotation
marks omitted)).
114. Id. at 718-19.
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ited introduction of Fornes's statements, which were evidence of actual innocence." 5
In federal court, Judge Chin dismissed objections based on failure
to exhaust state remedies in view of the likelihood of a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice."1 16 Noting that Morales had been incarcerated
for thirteen years,"' Judge Chin commented: "In the extraordinary
circumstances of this case, the interests of justice require that this
Court reach the issues presented without further delay."1 18 The actual
innocence claim based on a third party's confession and the time in
prison spent by the defendants weighed heavily on the judge's decision to resolve the question expeditiously. 1 9
The court's analysis focused on the constitutional dimension of the
state court's evidentiary decisions. Citing Supreme Court precedent
for the right to present a defense and the preeminence of constitutional rights over state evidence rules,12 0 the judge had to determine
whether the state court's exclusion of Fornes's statement rose to the
level of a due process violation.' 2 ' Initially, Fornes statement would

115. Id. at 719.
116. Id. at 720.
117. See id. at 717 n.4 ("Morales's co-defendant, Montalvo, filed a separate petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, which was assigned to a different judge in this Court. The
petition was dismissed on December 8, 1998. According to the docket sheet, judgment was entered on December 11, 1998, dismissing the petition, but Montalvo never
appealed. Consequently, his conviction is not before me. Montalvo may wish to
move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 for relief from the judgment dismissing his petition." (citation omitted)).
118. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
119. See id. at 721 ("Morales has been in prison for almost thirteen years. He has
presented substantial evidence of actual innocence. If he was wrongly convicted, any
further delay-no matter how brief-would only compound the fundamental unfairness of the situation.").
120. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ("Few rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense .

. .

. In

the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that
applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of
evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. The testimony
rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus
was well within the basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest.
That testimony also was critical to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the
hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." (citing
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948))).
121. See Morales, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 722 ("Because the right to present a defense
necessarily implicates state evidentiary rulings, federal courts considering evidentiary
claims on habeas review must be careful to differentiate between mere errors of state
law and those of constitutional dimension.").
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satisfy the criteria for either a declaration against penal interest 2 2 or
New York's version of the residual exception to the hearsay rule. 1 2 3
After an extensive analysis of the technical requirements and the indicia of reliability, the District Court found that the state judge erred by
excluding Fornes's statement to Morales's lawyer and Montalvo's
mother as hearsay. As for Father Towle's evidence, it was not blocked
by privilege, since it was not a formal confession and Fornes waived its
privacy by repeating his confession to others. 1 24
The all-important question was whether Fornes's attorney was prohibited from disclosure. The court found the conversations with the
legal aid counsel to be privileged under New York law. Since Fornes
did not repeat their contents to anyone afterwards and asserted his
Fifth Amendment rights, there was no waiver. And the privilege survived Fornes's death.12 5 However, the constitutional imperative declared in Chambers v. Mississippi, dictated a different result.
Moreover, by the time that Fornes spoke with his attorney, he had
already confessed to three other people-his privileged revelation was
an open secret. His motivation and earnestness to help two innocent
people while inculpating him added to the credibility of his admissions. Judge Chin ruled that Fornes's lawyer could reveal his statement and it was admissible notwithstanding privilege:
Fornes has been deceased for some four years now, while two apparently innocent men have spent nearly thirteen years in prison for
a crime that he committed. Under these remarkable circumstances,
the attorney-client privilege must not stand in the way of the truth.
Fornes's statements to Cohen [Legal Aid Society lawyer] are
admissible.'

26

Finding that exclusion of the Fornes's statements was not harmless
error, Judge Chin granted the habeas petition for Morales,'127 and ultimately, Montavlo.128 They were both released unconditionally. 1 29
122. Id. at 724 ("Under New York law, a statement is admissible as a declaration
against penal interest if it satisfies four elements: (1) the declarant is unavailable to
testify; (2) the declarant was aware at the time he made the statement that it was
contrary to his penal interest; (3) the declarant had competent knowledge of the underlying facts; and (4) there is sufficient evidence independent of the declaration to
assure its trustworthiness and reliability." (citations omitted)).
123. Id. at 725 ("New York courts have recently recognized a constitutionally-based
exception to the hearsay prohibition for certain evidence offered by defendants in
criminal cases." (citations omitted)).
124. Id. at 729.
125. Id. at 730.
126. Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 732.
128. See Morales v. Portuondo, 165 F. Supp. 2d 601, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("As to
Montalvo, I [Judge Chin] have not formally granted his habeas petition, but his circumstances are substantially similar to Morales's circumstances. Hence, Montalvo's
petition must be granted as well." (citation omitted)).
129. Id. at 614-15 ("Accordingly, the petitions are granted unconditionally.
Morales and Montalvo are hereby granted an unconditional discharge and the Bronx

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol17/iss4/6
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V17.I4.5

30

Strutin: Preserving Attorney-Client Confidentiality at the Cost of Another

2011]
V.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

529

"DEATH BE NOT PROUD" OR THE POST-MORTEM SOLUTION

Posthumous disclosure was a troubling obstacle for Judge Chin, two
of the responsible parties had confessed before they died, but, strictly
speaking, their privileged statements to their lawyers were inadmissible. Had not the judge relied on the supervening constitutional principles of Chambers v. Mississippi, those critical admissions might never
have seen the light of day. The attorneys in Alton Logan's case had
the presence of mind to record the evidence of their clients' statements for a time when he could no longer be harmed by its revelation.
Still, they faced the hurdle of its admission twenty-six years later. For
some, the post-mortem solution1 30 presents one of the best compromises to resolve this dilemma."
The post-mortem disclosure may end up being the option with the
fewest risks to the client and rest on the most tenable ethical
grounds.132 Still, there are serious drawbacks for the innocent client
who has lost appeals and post-conviction motions and serves their sentence without hope of relief. While the posthumous revelation apDistrict Attorney's Office is hereby barred from re-trying Morales or Montalvo for
the murder of Jose Antonio Rivera. Their convictions are vacated and the Bronx
District Attorney's Office is ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to restore
Morales and Montalvo to the status they were in prior to their arrest and prosecution
in the underlying murder case. These steps shall include expungement of the convictions and all references to them in the public record.").
130. It almost sounds like the title of a Sherlock Holmes story. But interestingly,
the idea might have been first inspired by one of fiction's greatest detectives. In The
Boscombe Valley Mystery, Sherlock Holmes uncovered the real culprit involved in a
murder for which someone else had been accused. The true murderer had hoped that
justice would prevail and the innocent young man would be freed without his coming
forward. More importantly, he was dying and he did not want to spend his last weeks
in jail. Nonetheless, Holmes would not take any chances so he arrived at a solution.
"Holmes rose and sat down at the table with his pen in his hand and a bundle of paper
before him. 'Just tell us the truth,' he said. 'I shall jot down the facts. You will sign it,
and Watson here can witness it. Then I could produce your confession at the last
extremity to save young McCarthy. I promise you that I shall not use it unless it is
absolutely needed."' Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Six Notable Adventures of Sherlock
Holmes 486 (Platt & Munk Publishers: NY 1960).
131. There are risks to waiting and, without some independent credible record of
the confession, the exculpatory evidence might become lost knowledge. And it might
be only be uncovered at a time when it can only be used to restore the reputation of a
deceased wrongfully convicted person. See, e.g., Mary Alice Robbins, Posthumous
Exoneration Sought Through Court of Inquiry, TEX. LAWYER (July 7, 2008), http://
www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202422790640 ("Relatives of a man who
died in prison while serving a 25-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault have
petitioned the 99th District Court in Lubbock for a court of inquiry to exonerate the
man because an inmate has confessed to the crime.").
132. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Confidentiality and Wrongful
Incarceration, 23 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. 46 (Summer 2008) ("The current draft [proposed post-mortem exception to confidentiality under Rule 1.6 to correct a wrongful
conviction], very narrowly drawn and discretionary rather than mandatory, seems unobjectionable. Our view is that a more expansive exception may possibly be justified,
without the death and reputational harm limits found in the current proposal.").
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proach has its virtues, it also has many legal hurdles to overcome
before becoming a panacea.
In 1979, Amerigo Vespucci along with Dennis Carney and Richard
Hogan had been talking and drinking at a local bar in Valley Stream,
New York.13 3 They all left about the same time. A short while later,
Hogan was found stabbed to death outside the bar. Dennis Carney
was indicted for Hogan's murder. He was represented by Edward
Galison.13 4 Eventually, the indictment was dismissed with leave to represent, which never occurred and the file was sealed. Carney committed suicide in 1991. Meanwhile, Vespucci vanished. The police
finally located him in 2001, and the following year, he was indicted for
the murder of Richard Hogan.13 5 Vespucci was represented by
Thomas Liotti.
In 1982, Carney admitted to his attorney, Galison, that Vespucci
was innocent of the crime. In 2001, when Galison heard about Vespucci's apprehension and prosecution, he became concerned that an
innocent person was being wrongfully prosecuted. A judge suggested
that he seek expert advice from Roy Simon, Ethics Professor at Hofstra Law School. Professor Simon recommended that Galison get an
advisory opinion on how to proceed from the Nassau County Bar Association Committee on federal ethics.1 3 6
The Committee offered the following advice: (1) notify the assistant
district attorney and the defense lawyer handling the Vespucci case
and inform them that he had exculpatory information; but (2) the attorney-client privilege prevented disclosure of his client's confession,
i.e., the specific details, unless court ordered. Galison advised Vespucci's attorney that he had exculpatory information, but refused to
reveal it because of privilege. Liotti filed an order to show cause to
compel disclosure of the details, including Galison's notes. A hearing
was ordered at which Attorney Galison testified about his involvement with Carney and his possession of exculpatory information, but
without disclosing the contents of their discussions. 1 37
133. People v. Vespucci, 745 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (County Ct. 2002).
134. Id. ("During Carney's criminal proceedings, he was represented by two attorneys, Mr. Edward Galison and Mr. Charles Chassen, who is now deceased."). An
issue not considered here is when the client's private confession is discovered among
the files transferred upon the sale of a practice or the demise of the representing
attorney. While the privilege belongs to the client, the transfer and retention of information between and among lawyers and law firms increases the possibilities of discovery by someone who had not learned the information firsthand.
135. Id. at 393 ("The charges are murder in the second degree as an intentional act
under N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1) (Consol. 1998), and murder in the second degree
under circumstances involving a depraved indifference to human life under N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(2) (Consol. 1998). The crime predates the 1995 statutory amendments to the Penal Law, and as such is not a capital offense.").
136. Id.
137. Id.
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After the hearing, Liotti submitted the Affidavit of Doreen Ferranti, Carney's common law wife."' Her life with Carney was marred
by violence and abuse.'3 9 During her time with him, he made revealing statements about his involvement in the Hogan murder:
The defendant, Vespucci, was ridiculed by Carney as a "pussy, a
punk and a junkie" and he, himself, took credit for killing Hogan.
According to Ms. Ferranti, Carney said "I iced him, I did it once
and got away with it and I can do it again and get away with it." He
joked about the murder and referred to it as "Pulling a Hogan" in
reference to a possible murder and getting away with the
consequences.14 0
Carney's death followed the murder of Ms. Ferranti's father and
brother.1 4'
Similar to Morales, a principal in the crime made an admission to
his attorney and a civilian. At the same time, an innocent person
faced prosecution for that crime, and his freedom hinged on the admissibility and credibility of those statements. The dilemma for the
court was whether to pierce the attorney-client privilege for a postmortem disclosure. The only safety valve in this case was a court order legitimizing a breach of privilege. But did the privilege still exist
once the client had died?
In the absence of a clear guideline under New York law,14 2 Judge
Belfi conducted an exhaustive analysis of national precedent and identified five different approaches to post-mortem privilege:
138. Id. ("Significantly, the defense has attached an affidavit of one Doreen Ferranti, who had a child with Dennis Carney in 1986. She described how Carney had
severely battered her during the course of their relationship. She claimed they lived
together from 1982 to 1991 in Nassau County, New York. She claimed to have a
common-law marriage, a concept not recognized in New York State.").
139. Id.
140. Id. at 394.
141. Id. ("In December 1991, Ms. Ferranti and her daughter were hiding from Carney. At that time, Carney broke into Ms. Ferranti's parent's house and killed her
father and her brother. Carney then immediately turned the gun on himself and died
as well.").
142. Id. at 394-95; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503(a) ("Confidential communication privileged; non-judicial proceedings. Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or
his employee, or any person who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential communication made between the attorney or his employee
and the client in the course of professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose such communication, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose
such communication, in any action, disciplinary trial or hearing, or administrative action, proceeding or hearing conducted by or on behalf of any state, municipal or local
governmental agency or by the legislature or any committee or body thereof. Evidence of any such communication obtained by any such person, and evidence resulting therefrom, shall not be disclosed by any state, municipal or local governmental
agency or by the legislature or any committee or body thereof. The relationship of an
attorney and client shall exist between a professional service corporation organized
under article fifteen of the business corporation law to practice as an attorney and
counselor-at-law and the clients to whom it renders legal services.").
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(1) Property Theory: "The first theory allows for the privilege to be
passed down like property to one's heirs, who become joint successor holders. (Walton v Van Camp, 283 SW2d 493 [Mo
19551.) Popular in the midwest, the position is that some persons might be deterred from disclosure had they known that
what they said could be revealed after their death to the embarrassment of their own reputations and in the interests of their
survivors. (Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 95 N.E.2d
304 [1950]; State v. McDermott, 79 Ohio App 3d 772, 607 N.E.2d
1164 [1992]; Mayberry v. State, 670 NE2d 1262 [Ind 1996].)",143
(2) Estate Theory: "A second view is that the privilege temporarily
survives and it ceases to exist when the client's estate is finally
distributed and his personal representative (executive or administrator) is discharged (see Cal Evid Code § 954; Colo L. Rev.
Comm. on Courts; Or Evid. Code rule 503 [3]). This west coast
approach limits the duration of the privilege. It is established
by statute and enables the personal representative to use the
privilege in the same manner as the deceased holder, with no
44
need to establish any affirmative showing to exert it."1
(3) Expiration Theory: "The third viewpoint is that the privilege
ceases upon the death of the original holder (see 1 Imwinkelried, New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence § 6.5.2
[20021). This is the extreme minority viewpoint and usually
makes its appearance in dissenting opinions (see Swidler & Berlin v United States, 524 US 399, 411 [1998] [O'Connor, J., dissenting]; Matter of John Doe GrandJury Investigation, 408 Mass
480, 486, 562 NE2d 69, 72 [1990] [Nolan, J., dissenting])." 1 4 5
(4) Absolute Privilege Theory: "The fourth theory is the exact opposite of the third approach, and considers the attorney-client
privilege as absolute. Some courts have held that "(1) where
legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are
at this instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by his legal advisor." (State v Doster,276 SC 647, 651,
284 SE2d 218, 220 [1981], citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292
[1961].)" 146
(5) Balancing Test Theory: "The fifth and final view is what could
be referred to as a compromise or 'balancing of interests' approach. This was the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in In re Sealed Case (124 F3d 230 [DC Cir 1997], revd sub
nom. Swidler & Berlin v United States, 524 US 399 [1998]).
Here the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that
upon the death of the original holder, the absolute privilege
expires and converts into a conditional privilege, at least when it
falls 'within the discrete zone of criminal litigation' (Sealed Case
143. Vespucci, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 396.
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at 234). In such a situation, even if there is a prima facie case
for applying the privilege, the trial judge could surmount the
privilege if he or she balanced the factors and found a compelling case-specific need for the relevance of the privileged
information.,1 47
The first three theories had not been considered by New York courts,
so Judge Belfi limited his analysis to the Absolute Privilege and Balancing Test theories. The absolutist viewpoint would sustain the Bar
Association view that Carney's statement to Galison was sacrosanct
even after his demise. As for the balancing approach, the court gave
credence to the viewpoint of a Pennsylvania decision followed by the
New York Court of Appeals in Belge," 8 which encompassed the property and estate theories:
The landmark decision of Cohen v Jenkintown Cab Co. (238 Pa
Super 456, 357 A2d 689 [1976]) set the standard that is generally
followed by most jurisdictions. According to Cohen, in deciding
whether to sustain or overrule the privilege, a judge may consider
such factors as (1) the import the disclosure would have had on the
client's daily life, (2) whether the disclosure would likely lead to
liability for the client or his estate, (3) whether disclosure would
blacken the memory of the deceased client, and (4) the need for the
testimony must be clearly established by the moving party. (Cohen,
supra, 238 Pa Super at 461-464, 357 A2d at 692-694.)149
Under the Belge/Cohen test the privilege could not be pierced. Factors one, two and three did not militate in favor of preserving the privilege, since Carney was dead, his estate might be liable but it was not a
significant issue and he died after killing two innocent persons. However, the fourth factor was the critical one. The testimony was not
necessary in light of his ex-wife's affidavit.
Conceivably, if the wife's report of Carney's confession had been
inadmissible, the result might have been different. But the judge held
that those statements were declarations against interest, since Carney
was subject to being reindicted for the crime at the time he spoke.
And since the affiant and declarant were common-law man and wife,
they were not covered by privilege."'o Uniquely, the decisions in Vespucci and Morales were made in the context of multiple sources of
alternate secondary confessions from lawyers and laypeople. However, in many instances, the secret will be shared only between the
attorney and her client.
Swidler & Berlin15 ' and Belge both represent mainstream views on
the sanctity of privilege, while acknowledging room to reexamine the
147. Id.
148. See People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (County Ct.), affd, 376 N.Y.S.2d
771 (App. Div. 1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976).
149. Id. at 798.
150. Id. at 798-99.
151. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
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issue when needed. The first case arose from the investigation into
the firing of staff from the White House Travel Office in 1993 known
as Travelgate. 152 Vince Foster, Deputy White House counsel at the
time, sought advice from James Hamilton, an attorney with Swidler &
Berlin, in anticipation of the inquiries to come. Hamilton met with
Foster for two hours and took three pages of handwritten notes.'5 3 A
little more than a week later Foster killed himself.'5 4 By the end of
1995, a federal grand jury had been convened and the Independent
Counsel subpoenaed Hamilton and Swidler & Berlin to obtain the
Foster interview notes.
After an in camera inspection, the judge found that the notes were
protected by attorney-client privilege. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the
privilege's posthumous survival hinged on a balancing of interests.15 5
In the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority upheld the absolutist view of the privilege after the client's death,
recognizing only a testamentary exception. 1 5 6 Interestingly, it was the
prosecution that sought an exception to the privilege because of the
importance of those notes to a criminal investigation, 57 relying on the
balancing test in Cohen, which had been cited by Judge Belfi in Vespucci. And the defense counsel was put in the position of calling for
strict adherence to the privilege post-mortem.15 8
152. Id. at 401 ("This dispute arises out of an investigation conducted by the Office
of the Independent Counsel into whether various individuals made false statements,
obstructed justice, or committed other crimes during investigations of the 1993 dismissal of employees from the White House Travel Office. Vincent W. Foster, Jr., was
Deputy White House Counsel when the firings occurred.").
153. Id. at 401-02.
154. See Whitewater: The Foster Report: 1993 Park Police Investigation, WASHINGTON PosT, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/whitewater/docs/
fosterii.htm (last viewed on February 26, 2011) ("This is the full text of the report on
the 1993 death of White House counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr., compiled by Whitewater independent counsel Kenneth Starr. After an exhaustive three-year investigation,
Starr reaffirmed that Foster's death was a suicide.").
155. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 402.
156. Id. at 405.
157. Id. at 403-04 ("The Independent Counsel argues that the attorney-client privilege should not prevent disclosure of confidential communications where the client
has died and the information is relevant to a criminal proceeding. There is some
authority for this position. One state appellate court and the Court of Appeals below
have held the privilege may be subject to posthumous exceptions in certain circumstances. In Cohen, a civil case, the court recognized that the privilege generally survives death, but concluded that it could make an exception where the interest of
justice was compelling and the interest of the client in preserving the confidence was
insignificant." (citations omitted)).
158. Just how far could a prosecutor ethically go in trying to pierce attorney-client
privilege to unearth exculpatory information? Cf ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Opinion 10-456 (2010), at 1 ("Although an ineffective assistance of counsel claim ordinarily waives the attorney-client privilege with regard to
some otherwise privileged information, that information still is protected by Model
Rule 1.6(a) unless the defendant gives informed consent to its disclosure or an excep-

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol17/iss4/6
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V17.I4.5

36

Strutin: Preserving Attorney-Client Confidentiality at the Cost of Another

2011]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

535

Justice Rehnquist focused on the importance of full and frank disclosures between client and attorney in life, and the potential liability
created by revealing those confidences posthumously.15 9 It was the
fear of uncertainty about how that information might be used in the
future, in either a civil or criminal context, that encouraged adherence
to a conservative view of the privilege. Opposing the Independent
Counsel's argument that there should be a limited exception for criminal cases and matters of "substantial importance," the petitioner,
Hamilton, conceded that there might be "exceptional circumstances
implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights that might warrant breaching the privilege."' 1 0 The Supreme Court did not address
this point because it did not find any "exceptional circumstances."
In Vespucci, Judge Belfi was quick to point out that under the absolutist view in Swidler & Berlin, privilege would stand no matter the
cost to an innocent person. 1 6 ' And he cited State v. Macumber16 2 to
highlight it, as did Justice Rehnquist. In this Arizona decision, the
trial judge presiding over a murder case prohibited two attorneys from
testifying to the confession of someone who had died1 63 based on the
legislative intent of the privilege statute:
The attorney-client privilege is statutory and an attorney is not allowed to waive the privilege under the circumstances of this case.
The legislature has presumably weighed the possibility of hampering justice in originally providing for the privilege. See State v. Alexander, 503 P.2d 777 (1972).64
The harsh application of any rule of evidence can be ameliorated by
the overarching mandate of constitutional principles such as due process and the right to present a defense underscored by the Supreme
tion to the confidentiality rule applies. Under Rule 1.6(b)(5), a lawyer may disclose
information protected by the rule only if the lawyer 'reasonably believes [it is] necessary' to do so in the lawyer's self-defense. The lawyer may have a reasonable need to
disclose relevant client information in a judicial proceeding to prevent harm to the
lawyer that may result from a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, it
is highly unlikely that a disclosure in response to a prosecution request, prior to a
court-supervised response by way of testimony or otherwise, will be justifiable.").
159. Swidler, 524 U.S. at 407 ("Knowing that communications will remain confidential even after death encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with
counsel. While the fear of disclosure, and the consequent withholding of information
from counsel, may be reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous disclosure in a
criminal context, it seems unreasonable to assume that it vanishes altogether. Clients
may be concerned about reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to friends or family. Posthumous disclosure of such communications may be as feared as disclosure
during the client's lifetime.").
160. Id. at 409. The phrase "exceptional circumstances" resembles Judge Chin's
observation about the "remarkable circumstances" in the Morales-Montalvo litigation. See Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
161. People v. Vespucci, 745 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 (County Ct. 2002).
162. State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
163. Id. at 1085.
164. Id. at 1086.
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Court in Chambers v. Mississippi.165 And Justice O'Connor, along
with Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissenting in Swidler & Berlin recognized the necessity of constitutional abrogation of a state privilege in a
compelling criminal case. She agreed with the value of recognizing
attorney-client privilege after death. But she was also cognizant of
when it must give way:
Although the attorney-client privilege ordinarily will survive the
death of the client, I do not agree with the Court that it inevitably
precludes disclosure of a deceased client's communications in criminal proceedings. In my view, a criminal defendant's right to exculpatory evidence or a compelling law enforcement need for
information may, where the testimony is not available from other
sources, override a client's posthumous interest in confidentiality.166
The "personal, reputational, and economic interest in confidentiality"
were minimized, and the risks of criminal liability eliminated after the
client has died. 6 7 Thus it would not undermine any of the rationales
for preserving the privilege, i.e., full disclosure and trust between attorney and client. Even in life, a prosecutorial grant of immunity
might have unearthed the information from an unwilling witness. But
post-mortem, an unbreachable wall of privilege closed off an invaluable avenue of critical evidence.' 8 "In my [Justice O'Connor] view,
the paramount value that our criminal justice system places on protecting an innocent defendant should outweigh a deceased client's interest in preserving confidences."16 9 For Justice O'Connor, the test
was whether the factual information was "necessary" to exonerate the
innocent or pursue an investigationo7 0 and unavailable from any other
source, e.g., a witness unencumbered by privilege or hearsay, which
would permit a judge to decide if the "interests in fairness and accuracy" outbalanced the sanctity of the privilege. 7
The dissenters showed insight into the scenario faced by attorneys
cited in the other cases discussed so far when Justice O'Connor wrote:
"Extreme injustice may occur, for example, where a criminal defendant seeks disclosure of a deceased client's confession to the
offense."17 2
165. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
166. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 411 (1998).
167. Id. at 412.
168. Id. at 412-13.
169. Id. at 413.
170. Id. at 416 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Where the exoneration of an innocent
criminal defendant or a compelling law enforcement interest is at stake, the harm of
precluding critical evidence that is unavailable by any other means outweighs the potential disincentive to forthright communication.").
171. Id. at 413-14.
172. See State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1976); cf. In the Matter of a John
Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 486, 562 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1990) (Nolan, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol17/iss4/6
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V17.I4.5

38

Strutin: Preserving Attorney-Client Confidentiality at the Cost of Another

ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

2011]

537

The balancing test envisioned by the dissenting Justices in Swidler &
Berlin and the D.C. Circuit Court would have to be circumspectly
applied in criminal prosecutions. First, upon the death of the original
holder (or client confessor), the absolute privilege expired and converted into a conditional privilege, at least when it fell "within the
discrete zone of criminal litigation." Then the trial judge could override the privilege if she balanced the factors and found a compelling
case, i.e., a specific need for relevant privileged information.'7
While the balancing test concept is a minority view, the mechanics
behind its application can find support in cases where the welfare of
another party, effective assistance of counsel, and client loyalty have
all played key roles.
In People v. Belge,'7 4 Robert F. Garrow, Jr., had been indicted for
murder in upstate New York. Two attorneys had been assigned to
represent him, Frank H. Armani and Francis R. Belge. In their discussions with Garrow, he confessed to committing three other murders.
Independently, Attorney Belge investigated the claim and found the
body of one of the victims described by Garrow.' 75 He did not inform
anyone about his discovery. A year later, in the course of mounting
an insanity defense, the admissions concerning the three additional
homicides were presented to the jury. 7 This revelation led to an indictment against Attorney Belge (Armani was no billed) for a Public
Health law violation, i.e., failing to notify the authorities about his
discovery. Ultimately, the trial judge dismissed the indictment on the
grounds of attorney-client privilege and in the interests of justice."'
While upholding the dismissal of the indictment, the appeals court
addressed the danger of an unassailable privilege:
In view of the fact that the claim of absolute privilege was proffered,
we note that the privilege is not all-encompassing and that in a
given case there may be conflicting considerations. We believe that
an attorney must protect his client's interests, but also must observe
basic human standardsof decency, having due regard to the need that
the legal system accord justice to the interests of society and its individual members.'7 8

It is the criminal context that weighs on the minds of judges who must
decide whether to further the ends of justice by strict adherence to a
173.
Berlin
174.
(App.

In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Swidler &
v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (County Ct.), affd, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771
Div. 1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976).

175. Id.

176. Id.
177. Id. at 803 ("It is the decision of this court that Francis R. Belge conducted
himself as an officer of the court with all the zeal at his command to protect the
constitutional rights of his client.").
178. Belge, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976)
(emphasis added).
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statutory rule of exclusion or the compelling mandates of the constitution. The Appellate Division went out of its way to assert a need to
protect the "interests of society and its individual members." In this
instance, it meant protecting Garrow's right to counsel and right to
present an insanity defense by preserving his attorney-client relationship against criminal prosecution.
What if someone else had been indicted for those other murders
that Garrow admitted? His attorneys kept quiet to preserve their client's ability to present a mental disease or defect defense. Early revelation would have destroyed the value of presenting that admission to
the jury. Meanwhile, an innocent person would have been paying the
price for nondisclosure. Garrow confessed to something that happened in the past, a completed crime. There were no other exigencies,
except the future harm facing our hypothetical wrongfully accused defendant. Still, there have been cases where a completed act continued
to have repercussions in the present and future. How would the existence of a continuing crime impact the decision to disclose a client's
admission of a past offense?
In the Oregon case of McClure v. Thompson, 9 the attorney, Christopher Mecca, was confronted with this continuum problem. His client, Robert McClure, had been charged with murdering a woman,
whom he had known. 8 0 At the same time the police believed that
McClure had done something with the woman's two young children,
who could not be found. In the course of the Mecca's representation,
he learned from McClure where the children were located. Eventually, McClure's lawyer chose to anonymously reveal this information
to the sheriff because he believed there was a chance they might still
be alive. However, when the sheriff, acting on this tip, found them
they were both dead from gunshot wounds to the head. McClure's
attorney withdrew from the case, and the defendant was indicted for
the murders of the woman and her children. The phone call and a
large amount of derivative evidence from the crime scenes were introduced in the prosecution's case. McClure was convicted and sentenced to three consecutive life sentences. 1 8 ' And the conviction was
affirmed on appeal.
McClure brought a federal habeas writ claiming that Mecca had
been ineffective because he breached client-confidentiality by informing law enforcement about the location of the missing children. But
the district court rejected his argument that a conflict of interest created by his attorney violated his constitutional right to counsel. Hearings and affidavits submitted in the state court and federal evidentiary
179. McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2003).
180. Id. at 1235 ("The fingerprints of Robert McClure, a friend of Jones, were
found in the blood in the home. On Saturday, April 28, McClure was arrested in
connection with the death of Carol Jones and the disappearance of the children.").
181. Id. at 1236.
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hearings revealed two different stories. According to the attorney, he
had spoken with McClure over a period of about three days.18 2 In
that time, the defendant claimed that he was being "framed." Later
his sister made a desperate call to the lawyer because she believed
that the children were still alive, although her brother had probably
been responsible for killing the mother." Still, McClure continued to
protest his innocence as to the murder and the disappeared children.
As discussions with McClure continued, the defendant seemed to
ramble and drift into bizarreries, leading his attorney to believe that
he was guilty of the murder and raised the stakes as to the status of
the children. The attorney, Mecca, was able to get his client to draw a
map of where the children might be. Then McClure made a revelation
that cemented his lawyer's belief that the children were alive: "McClure told Mecca that 'Satan killed Carol.' When Mecca asked, 'What
about the kids?' McClure replied, 'Jesus saved the kids.' Mecca
wrote in his notes that this statement 'hit me so abruptly, I immediately assumed that if Jesus saved the kids, that the kids are alive[.]"" 8 4
Failing to secure a plea deal in exchange for the undisclosed information,' 85 the lawyer resolved the potential ethical problems and went
forward with his anonymous tip.'"
On the other hand, McClure disputed Mecca's version of events.
He claimed that his attorney had promised confidentiality and that
nothing he told him would be revealed. McClure also claimed that the
lawyer pressured him into talking and to disclose incriminating details
without his consent.' 87 He suggested that his attorney had cooperated
with law enforcement, or at least put his interests ahead of the defendant's.18 8 This sharp contrast in stories had been resolved by the fed182. Id. at 1255 n.12 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1236 (majority opinion).
184. Id. at 1237.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1238 ("Mecca testified in his deposition that he thought that if the children were alive, it might relieve McClure of additional murder charges, but that the
children were his main concern.").
187. Id. at 1239 ("McClure disagreed with Mecca's account of the events leading up
to the anonymous call. In testimony in both the state and federal district court proceedings, he repeatedly insisted that he did not give Mecca permission to disclose any
information and that he was reassured that everything he told Mecca would remain
confidential. He said Mecca pressured him into disclosing information by setting up
the meeting with his sister and mother, and then disseminated that information to his
detriment without his knowledge or consent.").
188. This might be considered a variation or extension of the "second prosecutor"
conflict that sometimes arises in co-defense cases. C.f Scott Hamilton Dewey, Irreconcilable Differences: The Ninth Circuit's Conflicting Case Law Regarding Mutually
Exclusive Defenses of Criminal Codefendants, 8 BOALT I. CRIM. L. 2, 4 (2004) ("Inconsistent, conflicting defenses are yet another factor posing risk of prejudice in joint
trials. Various courts have used different terms to describe the issue of conflicting
defenses, but usually one of three constructions is used: mutually antagonistic defenses, mutually exclusive defenses, and irreconcilable defenses. These three terms
often are used interchangeably, but they should not be. 'Mutually antagonistic' de-
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eral judge in favor of defense counsel, 8 9 resulting in the court's
finding that either McClure consented to disclosure, and if not, it was
a reasonable course of action for the attorney to take-discovery of
the children while alive would have forestalled two additional murder
charges.' 90
The Ninth Circuit in reviewing these circumstances emphasized that
an ethical breach did not automatically support a finding of ineffectiveness of counsel.' 91 It was not prepared to find a rule of professional responsibility coterminous with the Sixth Amendment.1 92
Examining the disclosure issue, the court first noted that the confidential relationship defined in ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6 was not absolute, i.e., consent, waiver, and codified exceptions,
such as crime-fraud under Rule 1.6(b)(1).1 93 There were implied
statements by McClure and inferences by his attorney that formed the
basis for the conclusion that the authorities ought to be informed
about the children's whereabouts, and although McClure's contradictory impression of their meetings challenged this assumption, the
lower courts found the attorney to be more credible.

fenses include all defenses that conflict, such that the jury's acceptance of one will
make it harder for them to accept the other. 'Mutually exclusive' and 'irreconcilable'
defenses represent an extreme subcategory of 'mutually antagonistic' defenses: defenses that are truly irreconcilable, such that for the jury to believe and acquit one
defendant, it must convict the other. By contrast, other antagonistic defenses may be
difficult but not impossible to reconcile." (footnotes omitted)).
189. McClure, 323 F.3d at 1240.
190. Id. ("The federal district court accepted as not clearly erroneous the state
habeas court's finding that Mecca received permission to disclose anonymously the
whereabouts of the children, and stated that, even if McClure did not consent to disclosure, the disclosure was reasonable in light of the circumstances, including the facts
that there was a potential benefit to McClure if the children were alive and that the
decision was made 'in response to a rapid and extraordinary chain of events as they
unfolded."').
191. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (holding that ineffectiveness of counsel must be based on findings of deficient performance and sufficient
prejudice from that deficiency to violate the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment).
192. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1986) ("Under the Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel. When examining attorney conduct, a
court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the
Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the state's proper authority to define and
apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in
its courts. In some future case challenging attorney conduct in the course of a statecourt trial, we may need to define with greater precision the weight to be given to
recognized canons of ethics, the standards established by the state in statutes or professional codes, and the Sixth Amendment, in defining the proper scope and limits on
that conduct.").
193. McClure, 323 F.3d at 1242.
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Still, under these "exceptional circumstances," informed consent
was paramount.1 9 4 There was no justification for suspending counsel's
basic obligation to consult with his client to enable the latter to make
a knowing and intelligent decision.' 95 This had not been done, and it
was not excused by the urgency of the situation. The court commented that heightened risks militated in favor of a thorough consultation before McClure consented.1'9 Finding no basis for client
consent or waiver after consultation, nonetheless, the court believed
that the attorney had satisfied the requirements for the crime-fraud
exception.' 9 7
Strictly speaking, McClure had not admitted to a future crime. His
attorney was concerned about the escalation of a past criminal act,
kidnapping, into an aggravated offense, murder. Taking this concept
further, if a wrongful prosecution were to fall within the definition of
Rule 1.6(b)(1)'s "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm," a client's unrevealed confession to an offense attributed to another might be framed as a future crime-a complete and separate act
that will be triggered and exacerbated solely by the passage of time.1 98
194. Id. at 1243-44 ("Further, Mecca's account of the circumstances from which he
inferred McClure's consent changed over the years. His initial account stated that he
inferred consent from the fact that McClure called him at home, drew the map, and
gave it to him. It is a significant leap to infer McClure's consent to disclose the map to
law enforcement authorities from the fact that McClure gave the map to Mecca. Virtually all clients provide information to their attorneys, but they do so assuming that
the attorneys will not breach their duty of confidentiality. Further, Mecca's behavior
at the time of the disclosure suggested that he thought he lacked the kind of informed
consent that would give him the legal authority to act.").
195. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) ("When an accused
manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the
traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to
represent himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently' forgo those relinquished benefits. Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation,
he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open.'" (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience,
and conduct of the accused.").
196. McClure, 323 F.3d at 1245.
197. Id. at 1243.
198. Id. at 1245 ("This is not a traditional 'prevention of further criminal acts' case,
because all of the affirmative criminal acts performed by McClure had been completed at the time Mecca made his disclosure. Mecca was thus acting to prevent an
earlier criminal act from being transformed by the passage of time into a more serious
criminal offense. Nonetheless, we believe that where an attorney's or a client's omission to act could result in 'imminent death or substantial bodily harm' constituting a
separate and more severe crime from the one already committed, the exception to the
duty of confidentiality may be triggered." (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr
R. 1.6(b)(1) (Discussion Draft 1983)).
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The Ninth Circuit's analysis is instructive for innocence cases. They
began with a requirement of "objective reasonableness" of the attorney's belief under the circumstances that disclosure was necessary to
prevent the harm described by the rule.'99 The basis for this belief is
predicated on a "reasonable investigation and inquiry" before reaching that conclusion.20 0
McClure's statements and behavior provided the fountainhead for
Mecca's responses. From those clues and admissions, he began to formulate his belief about the status of the children, and the need for
helping them while they were alive. If his belief was unfounded, and
there was no basis for believing that the children were still alive,
Mecca's decisions would have fallen into a Belge type scenariowhere a discrete investigation of the facts might have led to evidence
of additional homicides, which did not warrant ethical sanctions.
Nonetheless, this was not the case, and Mecca's choices, which might
have benefited from further investigation, 201cls
were a close call. Still
the Ninth Circuit held that there was no reason to disturb the lower
courts finding that his violation of confidentiality did not rise to the
level of ineffectiveness of counsel.20 2 Nor was there a conflict of interest. Concededly, Mecca maintained two goals, finding the children
alive and preventing the filing of additional homicide charges. Crime
prevention, mandated by the Rules of Professional Conduct, under
these circumstances was not contrary to client loyalty.2 03
Therein lies the problem, an attorney must balance the competing
and conflicting interests of his client within the larger context of an
ethical obligation to the lives and well being of third parties or innocent victims. Whether this concept extends to someone wrongfully
charged with a crime rather than the victim of one is the key question. 204 The values society places on wrongful convictions underlie the
ethical approach attorneys must take towards this question. But the
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1246.
201. Id. at 1254 (Ferguson, J. dissenting) ("Besides directly inquiring with McClure,
Mecca could have also conducted some investigation outside of the jail cell. Mecca
could have armed himself with the map and driven to the locations on the map to
determine once and for all if the children were alive. Moreover, both Mecca and
McClure testified that they discussed the option of Mecca doing so; why Mecca chose
not to and instead went to the authorities is beyond reason. Indeed, if he truly believed the children were alive in the woods, at risk of exposure and starvation, it is
inexplicable that he would not have immediately gone to assist them. While locating
the bodies himself would undeniably have been a great burden, criminal defense attorneys should be prepared to meet the myriad challenges of their vocation - investigating and uncovering disturbing evidence related to their representation is but one;
confronting moral and ethical dilemmas competently is another.").
202. Id. at 1247 (majority opinion).
203. Id. at 1248.
204. Cf Shawn Armburst, Note, When Money Isn't Enough: The Case for Holistic
Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 180 (2004)
(discussing the need for "holistic" mechanisms for providing funds and assistance to
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entire burden should not rest with defense counsel. As will be discussed later, systemic reform is the better solution to this scenario
rather than conscripting attorneys into the roles of prosecutors (or
second prosecutors) against their clients.
In a universe of competing moral and ethical values, the Ninth Circuit in McClure laid out the importance of attorneys taking careful
conscientious steps before reaching the most extreme of options,
breaching client confidentiality. First, a clear definition of "reasonably certain death or substantial harm" has to be established. With that
guidepost in mind, an attorney confronting this situation can start out
on the right path: (1) full evaluation of the client's mental state; unambiguous discussion of the disclosure option, without tainting the client's story;2 05 and informed consent, if feasible; (2) investigation and
confirmation, as in Beige, which might have to be expedited depending on the status of the victim; 20 6 and (3) disclosure, whether based on
informed consent or exigency under the Rules; and choosing an appropriate mode of revelation, e.g., anonymously through negotiations
with the prosecutor or in court ex parte or before the jury as in Beige.
In each of these cases, the attorney-client privilege and the conduct
of the attorneys were approved in the end, and the privilege survived.
But the categorical approach to perpetually shielding privileged information might only be overcome in exceptional or remarkable circumstances-like wrongful conviction. In another sense, a client's
confession to a past crime that has continuing consequences might be
likened to a future crime, although the legal system is a long way from

persons wrongfully convicted of crimes similar to the damages awarded to toxic tort
victims).
205. Cf ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Carlyle Productions 1959). In Anatomy of a
Murder, there is a scene where the defense attorney, Paul Biegler (portrayed by
James Stewart), cautions (or coaches) the accused, Lt. Frederick "Manny" Manion
(played by Ben Gazzara), about his defense options before telling his story-otherwise the lawyer would be bound by what the client said. Id. Paul Biegler: "Lieutenant, there are four ways I can defend murder. Number one: it wasn't murder-it was
suicide or accidental. Number two: you didn't do it. Number three: you were legally
justified like self-defense or protection of your home. Number four: the killing was
excusable." Id. The following day when Biegler returns, Manion tells his story, which
implies his choice of defense: Lt. Manion: "I blacked out, I mean, after we talked
yesterday, I went back over the whole thing in my mind. You see, I hadn't done that
before-I was trying to forget about it. But when I tried remembering it, there were
some pieces missing." Id.
206. See People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (County Ct.), affd, 376 N.Y.S.2d
771 (App. Div. 1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976) (noting that Beige, Garrow's
attorney, investigated the area and discovered a body after Garrow confessed to additional murders). The exigency of time, like the police responding to an emergency
call, might create a sliding scale of reasonableness. Just as some courts have urged
that the attorney-client privilege should not be viewed in absolute terms, the same
might be said of the "reasonableness calculus" an attorney undergoes before reaching
the decision when to reveal a client's confidence.
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endorsing the criminalization of wrongful prosecutions.2 07 In the present, the choice that seems to balance the equities, while not fully addressing the immediate harm to a wrongful accused, is the postmortem exception.
The New York City Bar's Committee on Professional Responsibility
recently issued a report 20 8 in which they considered a posthumous disclosure amendment to their state's version of the confidentiality rule:
Rule 1.6(b)(6) This rule does not prohibit a lawyer from revealing
or using confidential information, to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to prevent or rectify the conviction of
another person for an offense that the lawyer reasonably believes
the other person did not commit, where the client to whom the confidential information relates is deceased.20 9
It is a broadly phrased exception that allows an attorney to act, i.e.,
"prevent or rectify," at any stage of a prosecution against an innocent
accused, tempered by the fact that the information was gained from a
"deceased" client. In their commentary to the proposed amendment,
the committee addressed the key factors that a lawyer must consider
to support a "reasonable" belief in their client's admission and the
necessity of disclosure:
In exercising discretion under this subsection, a lawyer shall give
due consideration to: (1) the wishes of the deceased client, if known;
(2) the magnitude of the punishment or other harm resulting from
the wrongful conviction; (3) the credibility of the deceased client's
admissions and the degree to which such admissions exculpate the
convicted person; (4) the likelihood that revealing the confidential
information will actually prevent or rectify the wrongful conviction;
and (5) the likely effect, if any, of the disclosure on the estate of the
deceased client, such as the financial or economic effects that could
arise from a lawsuit or other claim against the estate, and any effect
207. See, e.g., Jennifer Emily & Steve McGonigle, Dallas County District Attorney
Wants UnethicalProsecutorsPunished, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 4, 2008, available
at http://truthinjustice.org/dallasda.htm ("State Sen. Rodney Ellis, chief author of the

Texas law that created the compensation system for wrongfully convicted inmates,
said he, too, would support criminalizing the intentional withholding of evidence by
prosecutors. No criminal charge exists in Texas for a prosecutor who intentionally
commits a 'Brady violation.'").

208. N.Y. CITY BAR, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6 - AUTHORIZING DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF DECEASED CLIENTS (2010) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6], http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071914ProposedAmendmenttoRuleofProfessionalConductl.6.pdf; see also Joy & McMunigal, supra note 131 (discussing the debate within the American Bar Association over
whether to adopt a proposed amendment a similar amendment to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.6(c) "A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a deceased client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
to prevent or rectify the wrongful conviction of another").
209. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6, supra note
207, at 1.
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on the reputation or other intangible interests of the client's
beneficiaries.210

All of their criteria have foundations in cases that have examined this
problem, such as Alton Logan, Morales, Vespucci and Lee Wayne
Hunt.21 ' Such a rule would provide clarity to counsel and lessen the
specter of disciplinary action when an attorney is faced with this
choice. The attorney-client relationship, the administration of justice,
and the welfare of the innocent accused all justified a posthumous ethical exception in the eyes of the committee.2 12 And yet, the amendment cannot address the evidentiary limitations created by attorneyclient privilege and hearsay or the decision on how much harm an
innocent person must be subjected to before the choice to act becomes compelling.
VI.

"REASONABLY

CERTAIN DEATH OR SUBSTANTIAL
BODILY HARM"

Without clear ethical guidelines and safeguards, the uncovering of
this exculpatory evidence, buried in the confidences of the attorneyclient relationship, will be fortuitous at best. The saga of George
Reissfelder is a case in point. A Railway Express clerk in Boston's
South Station was shot in the head during a robbery in 1966.213 William (Silky) Sullivan had been identified by witnesses as the culprit.
210. Id. at 2.
211. See Adam Liptak, When Law Prevents Righting a Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/04/weekinreview/04liptak.html (A North Carolina defense lawyer was prevented by a trial judge from disclosing his deceased client's confession to a murder attributed to Wayne Hunt. "Mr. Cashwell, Mr. Hughes's
client, committed suicide in 2002, more than a decade after he pleaded guilty to the
1984 killings of Roland and Lisa Matthews. Prosecutors had maintained that Mr.
Hunt also participated in the killings, and Mr. Cashwell did nothing to refute them.
But Mr. Hughes said that Mr. Cashwell confessed in private that he single-handedly
killed the couple after an argument over whether a television was playing too loud.
'Lee Wayne Hunt had nothing to do with it,' Mr. Hughes said.").
212. PROPOSED AMENDMENT To RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr 1.6, supra note
207, at 8 ("We believe that our proposal is necessary to prevent the professional discipline of attorneys who come forward, after the death of a client, to reveal confidential
information that would exonerate a wrongfully convicted person. We further believe
that the value in rectifying such wrongful convictions outweighs the breach of attorney-client confidence, after the death of the client. The proposed rule would be discretionary, rather than mandatory, meaning that an attorney would exercise
discretion when deciding whether to reveal confidential information, in accordance
with such considerations as the nature of the information, the client's expressed
wishes, the extent of the punishment faced by the wrongly convicted individual, and
the extent to which disclosure would adversely affect interests of the client or client's
estate even after the client's death.").
213. Jeffrey Toobin, Kerry's Trials: What the Candidate Learned as a Lawyer, NEW
YORKER (May 10, 2004), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa
factl; Imprisoned in '66 Killing, He Goes Free in Boston, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1982,
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/31/us/imprisoned-in-66-killing-he-goes-free-in-bost
on.html.
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George Reissfelder, who had a criminal record, was turned in by his
girlfriend's father for planning a robbery in "South Boston." Sullivan
and Reissfelder were tried and convicted of murder and sentenced to
life. Ten years later, Reissfelder brought a motion challenging his conviction and a lawyer was assigned, Roanne Sragow.21 4 John
Zamparelli, who had represented Silky Sullivan at trial in 1967, contacted Sragow in 1982 and told her that everyone involved knew that
Reissfelder was innocent, but Reissfelder had a record and they
wanted to close the case. More importantly, before Silky died of leukemia in 1972, he made a deathbed confession to a priest. Reissfelder's lawyers tracked down Reverend Edward Cowhig, who signed
an affidavit repeating Sullivan's admission that Reissfelder was not
involved. At a post-conviction hearing held in 1982, ten witnesses
were called to testify about Reissfelder's innocence. The judge ordered a new trial, but the district attorney decided not to prosecute.
Reissfelder was freed.
This case, like Alton Logan's, signals the importance of the private
confession in the adjudication of innocence claims. And exonerations
like these may have been the impetus behind Massachusetts's, and
later Alaska's, amendments to their versions of Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal, and to the extent required by Rule 3.3,
Rule 4.1(b), or Rule 8.3 must reveal, such information:
(1) to prevent the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another, or to prevent the wrongful exe215
cution or incarcerationof another

However, the majority of jurisdictions have not followed suit and instead rely on an interpretation of the "reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm" language. 2 16 This formulation lacks the specificity of the Massachusetts and Alaska amendments, which target and
recognize the implication of cases like Logan's, Reissfelder's, and
Morales/Montalvo's. And it places a heavier burden on attorneys
struggling to divine whether and when to take action based on a private confession.
What can "substantial bodily harm" mean? Punishing an innocent
person entails everything from a suspended sentence, fine, or probation to imprisonment and even execution. And incarceration has endemic qualities that are aggravated by length and the conditions of
214. Toobin, supra note 212; Imprisoned in '66 Killing, supra note 212.
215. MAsS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 (emphasis added); see also ALASKA
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)(c) (stating that a lawyer may reveal a
confidence to prevent reasonably certain "wrongful execution or incarceration of
another").

216. See generally Colin Miller, Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be a
Wrongful Incarceration/Executionto Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 391, 395 (2008).
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confinement, e.g., exposure to violence, disease, sexual assault, mental
trauma, solitary confinement, extended sentence based on misconduct
while inside, and potentially death.21 7 Then there are the consequences of a conviction unrelated to punishment, but still severe: risk
of reincarceration for violating probation or parole, deportation, loss
of employment, denial of government benefits, disenfranchisement
and disqualification for other citizenship rights, harm to reputation,
mandatory registration, civil commitment as in the case of sex offenders, and other ensigns of civil death.
Prison is one of the most dangerous environments on earth,2 18 and
it puts incarcerated persons at significantly high risks in terms of
health problems, violence, and death.2 1 9 An innocent person would
also likely be ineligible for parole or early release or admission to ben217. See generally Jamila Johnson & Peter Moreno, Wrongful Incarcerationand Client Confidence Under RPC 1.6, Kings County Bar Bulletin (March 2010), http://www.
kcba.org/newsevents/barbulletin/archive/2010/10-03/article22.aspx ("There is no case
law or any ethics opinion that addresses whether the Washington rule requires disclosure of information that could overturn or prevent conviction of an innocent individual. There is, however, evidence to support the assertion that prison inmates, in
general, are subject to a present and substantial threat of bodily harm. The leading
support for this interpretation is the Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 66, comment c (2000), which provides that 'serious bodily harm,' in the context
of exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality, 'includes life-threatening illness
and injuries and the consequences of events such as imprisonment for a substantial
period and child sexual abuse."'); Hasbani, supra note 41, at 292 ("A wrongful incarceration exception to attorney-client confidentiality should not require an attorney to
disclose only when they are reasonably certain that substantial bodily harm might
ensue. The exception should be provided for situations in which an innocent is in
prison or facing prison time for a crime they did not commit, regardless of the bodily
harm they may or may not suffer, or the attorney's knowledge of such harm.").
218. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 391 (1996) ("Prisons are inherently dangerous institutions . . . ."). See generally Ken Strutin, Solitary Confinement, LLRX.com
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.llrx.com/features/solitaryconfinement.htm.
219. See, e.g., Ingrid A. Bingswanger, Chronic Medical Diseases Among Jail and
Prison Inmates, Soc'v CORRECTIONAL PHYSICIANS (Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.
("Our
corrdocs.org/framework.php?pagetype=newsstory&newsid=12170&bgn=1
findings suggest that jail and prison inmates have a disproportionate burden of many
chronic medical conditions compared to the general population, including hypertension, asthma, arthritis, cervical cancer and hepatitis. We found no differences in diabetes and that obesity was less common among jail and prison inmates."). See
generally Deaths in Custody Reporting Act, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
index.Cfm?ty=TP&tid=19 (last updated Apr. 1, 2011) ("BJS collects and disseminates
data on deaths that occur in local jails, state prisons, and during the process of arrests
by state and local law enforcement agencies through its Deaths in Custody Reporting
Program (DCRP)."); Prison Rape Elimination Act (Sexual Violence in Correctional
Facilities), U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.Cfm?ty=tp&tid=20 (last
updated Apr. 1, 2011) ("[National Prison Rape Statistics Program] NPRSP includes
five separate data collection efforts: the SURVEY ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE (SSV), the
NATIONAL INMATE SURVEY (NIS), the NATIONAL SURVEY OF YOUTH IN CUSTODY
(NSYC), the FORMER PRISONER SURVEY (FPS), and CLINICAL INDICATORS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CUSTODY (CISVC). Each of these collections is an independent
effort and, while not directly comparable, will provide various measures of the prevalence and characteristics of sexual assault in correctional facilities.").
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eficial programs because they would probably be unwilling to admit
guilt, which would undermine their claims of innocence. 220 As for
"reasonably certain death," the longer the term of life spent inside will
increase the mortality risk for the incarcerated. 22 1 Given the amount
of violence concentrated within prison walls, and a host of other conditions detrimental to health and well being, leading in some cases to a
very high rate of suicide,2 22 imprisonment might still represent a reasonably certain risk of death.
How much harm, short of execution, is enough to trigger an attorney's duty to act, as in the matter of crime prevention? 223 In the civil
sphere, precedent suggests that the bar is very high, perhaps unassailable. The Minnesota Supreme Court had been called upon to decide
whether a settlement from an auto accident should have been vacated
once it was learned that the doctors for the defendant insurance company withheld critical information about the plaintiff/victim's medical
condition. 224 Their approach to this question went to the heart of an
attorney's obligations to non-clients facing significant danger.
David Spaulding, a minor, was involved in an auto collision and his
father filed suit against John Zimmerman, the man who was driving
220. See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 29-30 (2002) (holding that the Kansas
state prison sexual abuse treatment program that required inmates to a sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, requiring an admission of guilt to the crime and uncharged sex offenses, did not violate Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination).
221. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T JusT., MEDICAL CAUSES OF
DEATH IN STATE PRISONS, 2001-2004 2 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/mcdsp04.pdf ("The death rate from illness rose sharply for prisoners serving
lengthy terms. For inmates who had served at least 10 years in State prison, the mortality rate due to illness (503 deaths per 100,000 inmates) was triple that of inmates
who had served less than 5 years in prison (162 per 100,000). Long-serving inmates
showed similar increases in death rates for many of the leading fatal illnesses. AIDSrelated causes had the smallest increase in mortality for long-serving inmates.").
222. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T JUST., SUICIDE AND HoMICIDE IN STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL JAILS 7-8 (2005), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/shsplj.pdf ("Jail inmate suicides were heavily concentrated in the first week
spent in custody. Forty-eight percent of all jail suicides during 2000-02 took place
during the inmate's first week following admission. In particular, almost a quarter of
all jail suicides took place either on the date of admission to jail (14%) or the following day (9%). ... The suicide rate of violent jail inmates (92 per 100,000) was nearly
triple that of nonviolent offenders (31). Kidnaping [sic] offenders had the highest
suicide rate (275), followed by those inmates held for rape (252) or homicide (182).").
223. Hasbani, supra note 41, at 294 ("Allowing an attorney the right to come forward to prevent an innocent person from serving any length of time in prison provides
the attorney with the opportunity to properly weigh the issues presented by wrongful
incarceration against a breach of confidentiality with his own client. Any rule that
sets a predetermined sentence requirement before allowing disclosure risks exposing

innocent people to the hazards presented by incarceration. Setting an arbitrary cutoff (for example, allowing disclosures only in the case of felony convictions) would
impose unfair distinctions among innocent people serving time for offenses they did
not commit. Those serving shorter sentences would have no avenue for recourse in
the law, even though they were equally innocent of a crime they did not commit.").
224. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1962).
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the car. Their family doctor examined David after the crash and reported on his injuries, mostly fractures and a head injury, observing
that his heart and aorta were normal.2 25 The defendant's attorneys
requested an examination as well. And their neurologist uncovered
something overlooked by the plaintiff's physician, the presence of an
aortic aneurysm.2 2 6 The doctor only disclosed this fact to the driver's
attorneys. Without revealing their neurologist's report, the defendant's lawyers reached a settlement with the plaintiff for $6,500.
Since Spaulding was a minor, he was only twenty years old at the
time of the accident, counsel for both parties had to submit a petition
to the court for approval of the settlement. The document's description of plaintiff's injuries referred only to the head injuries and rib
fractures. 2 27 Two years later, during David Spaulding's physical exam,
required for the army reserves, his family doctor discovered the aortic
aneurysm. After reexamining the X-rays from the accident, he deduced that it had originated at that time. 2 28 The problem was swiftly
addressed by a surgical procedure. As a result, Spaulding filed a new
action seeking to reopen the settlement and receive additional damages. 2 29 The trial court vacated the settlement after finding a causal
connection between the injuries and the accident, and that plaintiff's
counsel was unaware of it when the petition for settlement had originally been submitted for approval. While ultimately granting plaintiff
relief based on the defendant's concealment of a material fact, the
court was critical of plaintiff's attorney for not uncovering the information through diligent investigation and discovery.23 0
Both parties were adversarial and the defendant's attorneys were
under no ethical or legal obligation to aid the plaintiff to the disadvantage of their own client.2 31 Yet, since a joint application was made to
225. Id. at 707.
226. Id. ("On February 26, 1957, the latter reported to Messrs. Field, Arvesen &
Donoho, attorneys for defendant John Zimmerman, as follows: 'The one feature of
the case which bothers me more than any other part of the case is the fact that this
boy of 20 years of age has an aneurysm, which means a dilatation of the aorta and the
arch of the aorta. Whether this came out of this accident I cannot say with any degree
of certainty and I have discussed it with the Roentgenologist and a couple of Internists. Of course an aneurysm or dilatation of the aorta in a boy of this age is a serious
matter as far as his life. This aneurysm may dilate further and it might rupture with
further dilatation and this would cause his death.'").
227. Id. at 708.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 708-09 ("'The mistake concerning the existence of the aneurysm was not
mutual. For reasons which do not appear, plaintiff's doctor failed to ascertain its existence. By reason of the failure of plaintiff's counsel to use available rules of discovery, plaintiff's doctor and all his representatives did not learn that defendants and
their agents knew of its existence and possible serious consequences. Except for the
character of the concealment in the light of plaintiff's minority, the Court would, I
believe, be justified in denying plaintiff's motion to vacate, leaving him to whatever
questionable remedy he may have against his doctor and against his lawyer.").
231. Id. at 709.
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the court, the defendant's concealment took on a new importance.
"To hold that the concealment was not of such character as to result in
an unconscionable advantage over plaintiff's ignorance or mistake,
would be to penalize innocence and incompetence and reward less
than full performance of an officer of the Court's duty to make full
disclosure to the Court when applying for approval in minor settlement proceedings."2 32
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the settlement-despite the recognition of preserving the confidentiality of advantageous information in a civil suit that also imperiled the plaintiff's
well being. The Minnesota Supreme Court was concerned about the
misrepresentation to the court, not the ethics of adversaries towards
each other:
While no canon of ethics or legal obligation may have required
them to inform plaintiff or his counsel with respect thereto, or to
advise the court therein, it did become obvious to them at the time
that the settlement then made did not contemplate or take into consideration the disability described. This fact opened the way for the
court to later exercise its discretion in vacating the settlement and
under the circumstances described we cannot say that there was any
abuse of discretion on the part of the court in so doing under Rule
60.02(6) of Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 3 3
The civil contest described here, an action for money damages, was
waged against a subtext of life or death for the plaintiff. The principal
concern of the Minnesota Supreme Court was with the effect of the
non-disclosure on the trial court's approval of the settlement, i.e., judicial administration. As potentially serious as Spaulding's condition
had been, its discovery by the defendant was not enough to trigger
disclosure, except when it affected the decision of the court. This undergirds the notion that a defendant's attorney can and should protect
the confidentiality of even the most detrimental facts for the benefit of
their client.23 4
Notably, the trial judge intimated that the plaintiff's attorney might
have found the same facts through greater diligence and use of discovery and investigation. And he went so far as to suggest that Spaulding
might have had recourse against his own attorney for not uncovering
232. Id.
233. Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
234. See Peter A. Joy, Spaulding v. Zimmerman: Exploring the Ethics and Morality
of Lawyers and Physiciansin Practice,UNIV. TOKYO FAC. L. & GRADUATE SCH. FOR
L. & POL., 7 n.13, http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/biolaw/Spaulding%20v. %20Zimmerman
finaljoy.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) ("Although not discussed by the court in its
decision, the defense lawyers in Spauling v. Zimmerman are believed to have withheld information concerning their aneurysm from their clients. If they failed to discuss the aneurysm with their clients, Zimmerman and Ledermann, then they breached
their ethical duty to keep their clients advised of the status of the case. This breach of
an ethical duty to their clients, however, would not provide Spaulding with any
rights.").
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it, i.e., legal malpractice. On the criminal side of the fence, the prosecution has the onus of bringing cases and conducting investigations
that weed out the innocent from the guilty. Failure of the
prosecutorial function should not shift the burden to the defense, i.e.,
relying on a breach of confidentiality to correct a wrongful prosecution. While adversaries in a civil suit can withhold information to gain
advantage, there are constitutional and ethical prescriptions, like
Brady,2 35 that impose duties on the prosecution to see that justice is
done and disclose exculpatory evidence relating to guilt or
punishment.
Where does this leave the criminal defense lawyer? Some steps
have to be taken to make this assessment in a consistent way for all
lawyers and their clients to assure a bedrock application of confidentiality and its most important exceptions. In counseling clients, the lawyer who learns of a private confession might have to warn the client
about the limits of confidentiality. In other words, it would be a complementary warning accompanying an explanation of the future crime
exception. As for the standard for assessing the client's confession,
the Model Rules would suggest a reasonableness measure. But in
view of the stakes involved, i.e., the client's potential exposure to new
criminal charges, and exculpating an innocently accused person, a
higher standard might be required, such as beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 3 6
And once those hurdles have been overcome, i.e., the client's confession has been determined to be credible and the attorney has decided it was time to come forward, how should she proceed? In
Vespucci, the attorney sought the court's guidance and later an advisory ethics opinion. A judge could review the matter under seal and
in camera, leaving the source of the disclosure anonymous. Lastly,
counsel could approach the prosecutor along the same lines as in
Morales and McClure, perhaps seeking immunity or a favorable plea
and sentence recommendation.2 3 7
VII.

SYSTEMIC APPROACH: "IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE"

The problem in all of these cases is the lack of means and guidance
for addressing the causes and remedies of wrongful convictions. Ac235. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963) (holding that prosecution withholding from defense confession of accomplice stating that he, not Brady, committed
the homicide necessitated reversal of conviction).
236. See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1252 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[H]ow convinced was the attorney that their client was going to commit a crime (for example,
did he believe beyond a reasonable doubt?)?").
237. See id. at 1237 (nothing that McClure's attorney contacted the prosecutor and
told him there he might have information on other murders if the state was willing to
make a deal). Again, it would provide an opportunity to evaluate the strength of the
state's case against the innocent accused, which can factor in the timing of the
disclosure.
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tual innocence claims are a steep climb and find little support in the
courts in the face of a constitutionally fair trial.23 8 Lawyers privy to
exonerating information have few options with hopes for success, thus
disinclining them from coming forward. The North Carolina attorney
who attempted to testify about his deceased client's confession in order to free Lee Wayne Hunt from his sentence for murder was rebuffed by the prosecution and the courts. 239 Hunt's remaining option,
after a series of failed post-conviction motions,2 40 was to submit his
claim to the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission.2 41 Clem
ency or pardon applications are another route, but they have as little
chance of succeeding as an actual innocence claim.242
The Innocence Commission is an excellent idea, a kind of specialty
court providing effective remedies while addressing the causes of con238. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, ClaimingInnocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629,
1632 (2008) ("Our system remains at a crossroads, not yet fully adopting an approach
that directly assesses the probative impact of evidence of innocence, but failing to
discard many of the traditional limitations on innocence claims.").
239. See Liptak, supra note 210 ("Mr. Cashwell, Mr. Hughes's client, committed
suicide in 2002, more than a decade after he pleaded guilty to the 1984 killings of
Roland and Lisa Matthews. Prosecutors had maintained that Mr. Hunt also participated in the killings, and Mr. Cashwell did nothing to refute them. But Mr. Hughes
said that Mr. Cashwell confessed in private that he single-handedly killed the couple
after an argument over whether a television was playing too loud. 'Lee Wayne Hunt
had nothing to do with it,' Mr. Hughes said.").
240. See John Solomon, The End of a Failed Technique - But Not of a Prison
Sentence, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/11/17/AR2007111701641.html. In 1986, bullet matching was the
principle forensic evidence used to corroborate the circumstantial double homicide
charges against Hunt. Id. "In 2005, the [FBI] bureau ended its bullet-lead-matching
technique after experts concluded that the very type of testimony given in Hunt's case
- matching a crime-scene bullet to those in a suspect's box-was scientifically invalid." Id. Nonetheless, the courts refused to grant him a new trial, as well as rejecting
the private confession of his deceased co-perpetrator. Id.
241. Liptak, supra note 210 ("Mr. Hunt has one novel avenue left - applying to
the recently created North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission. That board
makes recommendations to a three-judge panel that can free exonerated prisoners.");
see also Bkrueger, Hunt Appeals to Innocence Commission, NEWS & OBSERVER.COM
(Mar. 31, 2008), http://projects.newsobserver.com/underthe dome/hunt-appeals-to
innocencecommission ("After losing his final appeal in state court, Lee Wayne Hunt
- who says he was wrongly convicted and imprisoned for a double murder - has
submitted his case to the N.C. Innocence Inquiry Commission, said Rich Rosen, a law
professor at UNC-Chapel Hill handling the case, reports Titan Barksdale."). See generally N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, http://www. innocencecommission-nc.
gov/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (providing a forum for post-conviction innocence claims in North Carolina).
242. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 153 (2009) ("Recent decades have seen a precipitous drop
in the number of clemency requests being granted by state executives and the president. The number of pardons has decreased, and commutations are particularly rare,
with the president and the vast majority of states governors granting only a handful of
commutations in the past decade - all while the number of people being sentenced
escalates at a rapid rate." (footnotes omitted)).
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stitutionally sound but factually wrong verdicts. 2 4 3 The Commission
or Innocence Court is only one model that straddles between judicial
post-conviction review and discretionary executive clemency. 2 4 4 It is
equally necessary to revamp the existing laws to adequately address
the unique scenarios in which exculpatory evidence emerges. Perhaps
a confessional for lawyers, where they could anonymously divulge exonerating facts learned from their clients in a discipline free zone, suggested by the outcomes in McClure and Vespucci. Still, an anonymous
tip line is no guarantor of the client's privacy. A connection between
the disclosure, the guilty client, and the attorney could somehow leak
out uncovering their identities. In which case, there should be a recognized protection for the original source of the information, a kind of
peace bond, in the form of transactional immunity.24 5 It is not a free
pass, although it shields a living defendant from criminal prosecution,2 46 the same outcome would have been true if it were a post243. See generally Criminal Justice Reform Commissions, THE INNOCENCE PROhttp://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Innocence-Commissions.php (last visited
Apr. 1, 2011) (identifying and describing various state-formed commissions, created
to help ensure the fairness and accuracy of the administration of criminal justice in
those states); Innocence Commissions in the U.S, THE INNOCENCE PROJECr, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/InnocenceCommissions in the US.php (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011) ("In order to identify, isolate, and address the flaws in the criminal justice system that lead to wrongful convictions, several states have formed commissions-Innocence Commissions or Criminal Justice Reform Commissions-that
help ensure the fairness and accuracy of the administration of criminal justice in that
state.").
244. See generally David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of PostConviction Review, 52 ARIz. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), http://scholarship.law.
georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1336&context=facpub ("By itself, the
commission approach cannot solve the Innocence Problem, for the sources of wrongful conviction are too diverse, and not all errors can be caught after trial. But North
Carolina's approach has the potential to recast the debate about the Innocence Problem from one about Constitutional rights, the limits of habeas corpus, and judicial
resources to a pragmatic discussion of how an expert agency can best deliver accurate,
efficient, and accountable results. The North Carolina commission, along with the
process that brought it into existence, ought to serve as a model for other states as
they wrestle with the difficulties of the Innocence Problem.").
245. Depending on the merits of the prosecutor's evidence, the confession-corroboration rule might block a successful case against a new defendant despite their admission of guilt, thus deflecting the onus of granting transactional immunity. See Smith v.
United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) ("The general rule that an accused may not be
convicted on his own uncorroborated confession has previously been recognized by
this Court, and has been consistently applied in the lower federal courts and in the
overwhelming majority of state courts. Its purpose is to prevent 'errors in convictions
based upon untrue confessions alone'; its foundation lies in a long history of judicial
experience with confessions and in the realization that sound law enforcement requires police investigations which extend beyond the words of the accused." (citations
omitted)).
246. Transactional immunity, the equivalent of an acquittal in a criminal trial, does
not leave victims or their families without remedies. See, e.g., Rufo v. Simpson, 103
Cal. Rptr. 2d 492 (Ct. App. 2001)("In a prior criminal trial, [Orenthal James] Simpson
was acquitted of the murders of Nicole [Brown Simpson] and Ronald [Goldman]. In
the present civil trial, the jury concluded that Simpson killed Nicole and Ronald." Id.
JECT,
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mortem disclosure. In either case the confessor would be beyond
criminal legal process.
In addition, the rules for the admission of newly discovered evidence ought to be modified to embrace exculpatory confessions revealed in this way.24 7 In Macumber, the judge disallowed lawyer
testimony repeating an admission made by his deceased client exculpating another. And in the Lee Wayne Hunt case, the court forewarned the lawyer that he faced disciplinary charges for attempting to
do the same. However, in cases such as Morales and Vespucci, the
courts were willing to consider the evidence and hear testimony
before reaching a conclusion. This type of inconsistency in approaches only leads to confusion and anxiety for counsel already
under enormous pressure in trying to determine the best course of
action. In these situations, attorney-client privilege and the ethical
constraint of confidentiality were the lynchpin issues. A statute that
permitted the admission of posthumous exculpatory evidence for ex
parte review, similar to the one conducted in Swidler & Berlin, would
at least provide an opportunity for the statement to be entered into
the record. This would give the innocent accused or convicted the
chance to raise legal challenges seeking admission of that disclosure
through post-conviction motions based on newly discovered evidence;
presented in a petition to an Innocence Commission; or submitted as
part of a plea for clemency or release on parole. A post-mortem release allows an attorney to reveal a client's secret after their death, but
counsel is not immortal, and someone will administer that crucial inh
248
htifomto
before the
information bfr
Placing that
formation after she is gone.
at 497. The appeals court affirmed the trial judge's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and damage awards. Id. "Sharon Rufo and Fredric Goldman, the parents and heirs
of Ronald Goldman, were awarded $8.5 million compensatory damages on their cause
of action for wrongful death. Fredric Goldman as personal representative of the estate of Ronald Goldman was awarded minor compensatory damages and $12.5 million punitive damages on the survival action, the cause of action Ronald Goldman
would have had if he survived. Louis H. Brown as personal representative of the
estate of Nicole Brown Simpson was awarded minor compensatory damages and $
12.5 million punitive damages on the survival action, the cause of action Nicole Brown
Simpson would have had if she survived." Id. (citations omitted).).
247. See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, California Dreaming? The Golden State's Restless
Approach to Newly Discovered Evidence of Innocence, 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1437,
1477 ("As a result, California should weigh the option of developing a single remedy
for newly discovered non-DNA evidence claims - a remedy that fuses attributes of
the new trial, habeas corpus, and coram nobis procedures. New York already embraces this type of model. In the past, New York recognized a litany of post-trial
remedies, such as common law coram nobis and motions for a new trial on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence. The New York state legislature passed article
440 of the Criminal Procedure Law in 1970 to 'collectively . . . embrace all extant nonappellate post-judgment remedies and motions to challenge the validity of a judgment
of conviction."' (footnotes omitted)).
248. Lawyers are cautioned to make some provision for the transfer and responsibility of client files after a firm dissolves or an attorney dies. See, e.g., Terence M.
Troyer, Picking up the Pieces After the Death or Disability of a Lawyer, MASS.GOV
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court, where testimony can be transcribed and affidavits filed,2 49
removes uncertainty and risk that might occur when all the secret
sharers have passed on.250
Preserving the information is paramount. Alton Logan's lawyers,
along with his co-defendant's counsel, wrote out an affidavit and
locked it away for twenty-six years. In Belge, the defense lawyer visited the location where Garrow claimed the undiscovered bodies were
hidden. He might have photographed the scene or preserved his observations in writing. Moreover, he might have taken several precautionary steps, such as seeking the counsel of jurists, legal scholars, and
bar ethics committees before proceeding as in Vespucci. Conveying
the information subtly to the prosecution through plea negotiation as
in McClure, or even the private assurance between co-defense counsels as in Ennis, might be the next stage. Inviting an ex parte review
by the court in the innocent person's case might be another route, as
in Swidler & Berlin, where counsel could get an advanced ruling, or a
hearing to preserve the statement, which occurred in Morales. Each
choice would have to be tempered by the outcome for the guilty cli(Feb. 2002), http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/pieces.htm ("The duties of a commissioner
[appointed by the Supreme Judicial Court] who takes charge of a deceased or disabled lawyer's practice are set out in summary fashion in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 14 and
apply by analogy to any lawyer performing a similar function. That rule specifies
three general tasks: (1) to make an inventory of the files, (2) to take appropriate
action to protect the interests of clients, and (3) to take appropriate action to protect
the interests of the lawyer. In addition, the rule directs the commissioner not to 'disclose any information contained in any files . . . without the consent of the client ...
except as necessary to carry out the order of this court."'). The sage wisdom for
preserving confidential client files applies with greater force to courts where they can
be accessed by a convicted person attempting to prove their innocence.
249. This also supports the argument for permanent retention of court files in criminal cases, since a post-conviction motion based on newly discovered evidence can be
raised at almost any time. See generally Records Retention and Disposition Schedule:
CriminalRecords of the Supreme and County Courts, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. Sys. (May
2009), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/admin/recordsmanagement/courtrecords/
SUPERIOR%20CRIMINAL%20MAY%202009%20REVISION%20-%20COLOR
%20ADOBE%20PDF%20VERSION.pdf ("Post-1949 [felony] cases with the exception of Capital Cases which result in a conviction: Retain for fifty years from date of
disposition, then destroy, except for cases to be retained as a permanent research
sample."). Cf Evidence Preservation, THE INNOCENCE PROJEcr, http://www.inno
cenceproject.org/fix/Evidence-Handling.php (last viewed on March 27, 2011). And
the death of a private confessor, their attorney, and potential independent witnesses
to the statement will likely result in the confession fading into oblivion under the
current records retention schedules for attorneys. See generally Lee R. Nemchek,
Records Retention in the Private Legal Environment: Annotated Bibliography and
ProgramImplementation Tools, 93 LAw LIBR. J. 7 (2001).
250. This will also help the prosecution in their efforts to prevent spoliation of
Brady evidence. See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 423 (2010)
("The Brady doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on the trial prosecutor to investigate, preserve, and disclose favorable information located in the prosecutor's files, as
well as information in the possession of any member of the prosecution team." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

57

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 17 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 6

556

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

ent, along the lines of the advice that the legal aid attorney in Morales
gave to Fornes before coming forward. In multiple offender crimes, a
confession might do no more than add another name to the indictment. These disclosures would be most effective in binary situations,
where only one or the other could have been responsible for the
crime.

VIII:

TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY OR THE INCLUSIONARY RULE251

Assuming the absence of client cooperation or a post-mortem release, the client whose lawyer reveals an incriminating confidence to
preserve another's innocence is now subject to prosecution, or at least
investigation, concerning that crime. However, from a systemic point
of view, there are mechanisms that can rebalance the interests of justice. For example, transactional immunity would compensate the confessing client for the collective loss of: (1) Fifth Amendment privilege
against incrimination; 252 (2) confidentiality and attorney-client privilege; (3) right to counsel; (4) right to present a defense; (5) loyalty of
counsel; (6) confidence in her attorney; and (7) faith in due process
Still, this would only be an adjunct to fundand the justice system.
mental changes that expand the scope of safeguards to prevent
wrongful prosecutions in the first instance, such as increased oversight

251. A grant of transactional immunity allows a witness to give exculpatory
evidence without fear of prosecution or loss of Fifth Amendment privilege. It
represents a rule of inclusion, encouraging the revelation and admission of
exonerating testimony. Unlike rules of exclusion that keep out otherwise relevant
and credible evidence because of a constitutional violation, this rule would uphold
constitutional values, i.e., Fifth Amendment and Due Process, by opening the door to
confessions for the purpose of preventing a wrongful conviction and proving actual
innocence.
252. But see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) ("We hold that such
immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim
of the privilege. While a grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate
with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader. Transactional immunity,
which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled
testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the
Fifth Amendment privilege.").
253. Cf Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) ("In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right [defendant's standing to
raise a Fourth Amendment claim and testify at a suppression hearing] should have to
be surrendered in order to assert another [Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination at trial]. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of
a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
objection.").
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of criminal cases254 and effective remedies for violations of due
process.2 55
It might be possible to balance the equities for disclosing client confidences, in order to free an innocent accused, through transactional
immunity. It affords the same level of protections for the living client
that the post-mortem release provides. "Use immunity" would prohibit the statements from coming in as direct evidence, but once the
client was on the prosecution's radar, they could build a case without
them. 2 56 In view of the sacrifices and the risk of harm to an innocent
accused, only blanket immunity will suffice to provide the confessing
client whose statements are revealed through their attorney with the
same level of safeguards found in the Fifth Amendment, due process,
and the attorney-client relationship.2 5 7
As a starting point, a prosecutor might be compelled to grant use
immunity to defense witnesses possessing exculpatory information,
254. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Ridolfi & Maurice Possley, PreventableError:A Report
on ProsecutorialMisconduct in California 1997-2009, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
SANTA CLARA U. SCH. L., 44-45 (Oct. 2010) (describes the roles of prosecutors,
courts and the bar in addressing prosecutorial misconduct).
255. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1511 (2009)(The author proposes a compromise solution to prosecutorial misconduct in cases where the faults were procedural and independent of factual innocence: "To address this problem, this Article proposes adding
to courts' remedial toolkit an intermediate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct: reduction of the defendant's sentence. I do not propose sentence reduction where misconduct has undermined the reliability of the conviction. In such cases, the defendant
should not be sentenced at all. But misconduct often inflicts serious dignitary and
emotional harms independent of the effect on the verdict. For instance, a defendant
who learns that the prosecution has hidden potentially exculpatory evidence may suffer lifelong distrust and resentment of the government, even if the defendant discovers the evidence in time to avoid any effect on the verdict. Likewise, long delays in
trial can cause major stress and inconvenience for defendants. And even when misconduct is truly 'harmless' to the particular defendant, sanctions may be necessary to
condemn it effectively and to deter its repetition. Sentence reduction could serve
these corrective, expressive, and deterrent purposes." Id.).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1202 (3d Cir. 1978) ("The
legislative history of the [federal] immunity statutes also shows no sign of a purpose to
benefit defendants. The narrow purpose of the use immunity provisions was twofold:
to eliminate those federal immunity statutes that required conferral of transactional
rather than use immunity and to reduce the number and complexity of immunity statutes. The shift to use immunity was intended to take advantage of the more favorable
view of use immunity expressed by the Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission. The clear intent of the shift to use immunity was to make it less costly for the
United States Attorney to grant immunity, by allowing for fuller prosecution of both
the defendant and the immunized witness. In broader perspective, it is apparent that
the immunity statute was part of a massive program of legislation whose central purpose, as its opponents recognized, was to strengthen the hand of the prosecution and
to weaken that of the criminal defendant, in many cases to the full extent permitted
by the protections of the Bill of Rights." (citations and footnotes omitted)).
257. In other words, the remedy would be to create a "Fifth Amendment plus"
protection for confessing defendants that will help to maintain the very foundational
rights undergirding the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and due process.
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under the right circumstances. Judge Garth of the Third Circuit noted
two due process theories that would apply:
(1) [I]n cases where government actions denying use immunity to
defense witnesses were undertaken with the "deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process," the court has
the remedial power to order acquittal unless on retrial the government grants statutory immunity. (citation omitted).
(2) [I]n certain cases a court may have "inherent authority to effectuate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a
judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony
is essential to an effective defense." 25 8
The statutory remedy for prosecutorial misconduct or distortion of the
trial process, where the prosecution refused to grant immunity for defense witnesses offering relevant or exculpatory evidence, was a new
trial. 2 59 But where "unconstitutional abuse" occurred, i.e. barring exonerating evidence, due process empowered the court to grant a form
of "judicially fashioned immunity." 26 0
The basis of this formulation was derived from the constitutional
right to present a defense, and hence exculpatory evidence, 2 6 1 rooted
in Chambers and other pillars, such as Gideon2 6 2 and Brady.263 The
key difference from those cases is that a new trial would only bring the
parties back to square one, i.e., inadmissible exonerating testimony
barred by Fifth Amendment privilege.
Preceding the grant of immunity and admission of defense evidence, the Court of Appeals suggested that certain safeguards had to
be taken: "[I]mmunity must be properly sought in the district court;
the defense witness must be available to testify; the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential;
and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail
against a grant of immunity." 2 64 The problem faced in some of the
258. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 966 (3d Cir. 1980) United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding "the evidentiary showing required to
justify reversal on that ground must be a substantial one. The defendant must be
prepared to show that the government's decisions were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process. Where such a showing is made,
the court has inherent remedial power to require that the distortion be redressed by
requiring a grant of use immunity to defense witnesses as an alternative to dismissal."
The burden had not been met in this case.).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 969-70. ("First the need for 'judicial' immunity is triggered, not by
prosecutorial misconduct or intentional distortion of the trial process, but by the fact
that the defendant is prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial
to his case. Second, the immunity granted is court decreed immunity; it is not
achieved by any order directed to the executive, requiring the executive to provide
statutory immunity.")
261. Id. at 971.
262. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
263. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
264. Smith, 615 F.2d at 972 (footnote omitted).
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post-mortem admission cases was addressed by the Third Circuit,
namely defining the nature of the evidence and its potential benefit in
exculpating the defendant: "Immunity will be denied if the proffered
testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or if it is found to relate only to the credibility of the government's witnesses." 2 6 5 Another basis for denying immunity would be a
"strong countervailing interest" presented by the government.
The ability to prosecute the defense witness (confessing client)
would be influenced by a string of variables, only a few of which were
raised by Judge Garth:
In many instances, use immunity, which was all that was sought here
and is all that is constitutionally required, Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972), is virtually
costless to the government. For example, the government may have
already assembled all the evidence necessary to prosecute the witness
independent of the witness' testimony. Or the government may be
able to "sterilize" the testimony of the immunized witness and so isolate it from any future testimony of the witness that it would not
trench upon any of the witness' constitutional rights if he were subsequently to be prosecuted. See Kastigarv. United States, supra. Finally,
the government may seek a postponement of the defendant's trial so
that it may complete its investigation of the defense witness who is
the subject of an immunity application. While these options are not
intended to be all inclusive, if any of these options are available to the
government, then it would appear to us that the government would
have no significant interests which countervail the defendant's due
process rights. Any interest the government may have in withholding
immunity in such a situation would be purely formal, possibly suspect
and should not, without close scrutiny, impede a judicial grant of
immunity. 266
The principal interest of the prosecution is justice.26 7 Therefore, the
court's reasoning can be taken further. There is no supportable
"countervailing interest" for prosecuting an innocent person. Excluding the confession of a third party to maintain the integrity of the
prosecutor's case is less important than the overriding due process interest in halting those prosecutions before an innocent defendant experiences "substantial harm." Under the test described above and on
due process grounds, when a third party's confession would provide a
zero sum result, complete exoneration for the innocent accused, then
there is no rationale for withholding immunity, either by the prosecution or the court. Only a "mechanical application" of procedure
265. Id. (footnote omitted).
266. Id. at 973 (footnote omitted).
267. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted
but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers
when any accused is treated unfairly.").
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would allow conviction of the innocent in the face of unambiguous
exculpatory evidence, e.g., DNA exonerations.
Finally, assuming the privilege and hearsay objections have been
overcome, what should be the remedy? Judge Garth pointed out the
inefficacy of a new trial unless the admissibility issues were resolved.
Depending on the stage of the case, the prosecution could withdraw
the indictment or agree to a dismissal in the interests of justice. If it
went to trial, the jury might still doubt the credibility of the admission26 8 and find the accused guilty-leaving the judge to direct a verdict. Barring success at any of these pretrial stages, the confession
evidence could wend its way through appeals, writs, parole board
hearings, and eventually clemency applications, slowly losing vitality
on its long climb through the post-conviction procedural morass.
CONCLUSION

The Rules of Professional Conduct, bar committee ethics opinions,
court rulings, and anecdotal cases paint a complex mosaic for an attorney newly confronting a client who reveals responsibility for another's criminal charge. Judging by the cases already discussed,
lawyers have taken different and difficult paths at this ethical juncture.
Having overcome the initial hurdles of evaluating and investigating
the credibility of the client's confession, and deciding that the innocent person faces "reasonably certain death or substantial harm,"
counsel must set about choosing a method to deliver the information.
The client will determine this in large part.2 6 9 A living confessor
might give informed consent, outlined by the Ninth Circuit in McClure, or agree to sign a post-mortem release as in Alton Logan's

268. A client taking the stand, as Fornes did in Morales, will likely be more persuasive than a second hand statement from an attorney. And in either case, the witness's
credibility in the eyes of the jury is not a foregone conclusion regardless of their motive in testifying. Cf WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION (MGM Pictures 1957) (portraying a wife who exculpates her husband by first becoming a witness against him in
a murder trial and then setting herself up for impeachment to discredit her
testimony).
269. See generally J. Vincent Aprile II, Confidential Information and Wrongful
Convictions, 25 CRIM. JuST. 50, 51 (Summer 2010) ("[C]ounsel must place the client's
interests first and use counsel's experience and expertise to design alternative approaches to protect the client from adverse fallout from the client revealing that he or
she was the perpetrator and the convicted individual is factually innocent. Immunity
from prosecution or a gubernatorial pardon or commutation are but some approaches
for counsel to consider and investigate as a means of protecting the client. Faced with
a client who is unwilling to disclose committing the crime for which another has been
sentenced, counsel should not abandon the client but agree to maintain the client's
confidences while working to create a 'win-win' situation where the client's disclosures will ensure the exoneration of the wrongly convicted individual but protect and,
if possible, benefit the client.").
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case. However, if the client chooses not to act against his or her interests, then the lawyer will take the next step alone.2 70
In every case where a client confesses to a crime attributed to another, the lawyer is confronted by the trilemma:
(1) Evaluation: The client's story must be credible. The attorney
has a duty to reasonably investigate the facts, principally for his
client's sake; obtain some kind of confirmation; and assess the
client's motivation and mental state behind making the disclosure. In the last analysis, the client's credibility has to rest on
some standard that will convince the attorney she is being sincere, e.g., beyond a reasonable doubt.
(2) Analysis: Counsel must reconnoiter their position from an ethical standpoint, i.e., confidentiality and duty of loyalty; an evidentiary perspective, i.e., attorney-client privilege and hearsay;
and finally, the systemic impact of preventing wrongful convictions and unjust punishments (or executions), of innocent
parties.
(3) Decision: Under what circumstances can and should an attorney
make this disclosure? Several factors to be addressed will be
the information's value, would it result in exculpation or only
incriminate the client-confessor; admissibility, will a jury get to
hear the statement over privilege and hearsay objections; and
lastly, persuasiveness, what impact might it have if any, perhaps
the client will be unconvincing? The confession might be a total
acceptance of responsibility for the crime or only provide partial exculpation of another, making the outcome for total exoneration less certain.
The cross-section of ethics where an attorney's obligation to their
client collides with their sense of duty to the innocent highlights the
need for equity in criminal practice.2 7 1 While the Model Rules of Pro270. A client is not obligated to adopt his lawyer's code of ethics or morale stance.
And it is reasonable for someone already facing criminal charges to avoid the risk of
additional punishment. When there is a conflict with the client who will not agree to
disclosure, limited or full or post-mortem, the attorney's decision to act contrary to
those wishes is one of the most difficult decisions to face. Cf John H. Blume, Killing
the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REv. 939, 939-40

(2005) ("Since Gregg v. Georgia ushered in the 'modern era' of capital punishment,
there have been 885 executions, 106 of which, including the first, involved 'volunteers,' or inmates who waived their appeals and permitted the death sentence to be
carried out. Moreover, for every successful volunteer, there have been numerous
death-row inmates who took affirmative steps to waive their appeals but subsequently
changed their minds, and even more who contemplated forgoing additional legal challenges to their death sentence and submitting to execution. Every death-row volunteer inevitably presents us with the following question: Should a death-row inmate
who wishes to waive his appeals be viewed as a client making a legal decision to
accept the justness of his punishment, or as a person seeking the aid of the state in
committing suicide?" (footnotes omitted)).
271. See, e.g., In re Flournoy, 1 Ga. 606, 607 (1846) ("The effect of a pardon is, to
restore the citizen to the condition in which he was before conviction; it proceeds
upon the idea of innocence. The power is given to the Executive to relieve against the
possible contingency, under all systems of laws, of a wrongful conviction. And as all
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fessional Conduct have changed and liberalized the approach to confidentiality, Rule 1.6(b)(1) has not gone far enough to guide lawyers
confronted with private confessions exonerating third parties. Attorneys are forced to fall back on their own resources and select from a
cafeteria of options that often confound their best intentions. Every
confidentiality problem implicates evidentiary and constitutional issues. And the complexity of this scenario makes it even harder to find
a resolution that preserves the innocent and guards the sacred tenet of
a counsel's duty of loyalty to their confessing client.
This scenario will become more common as we have entered an age
of extreme information sharing, where lawyers will be able to learn
incriminating information about their clients that has not been volunteered. Thus, an attorney may be put in the position of asking her
client about a confession to another's crime that has been posted on
Facebook.2 72 It is an abridgment of reason to reach a categorical conclusion about how to respond to situations where two equally valid
principles are at stake. Confidentiality and innocence should not be
held hostage by each other. The remedy lies in improving the system
of justice so that the principal responsibility for preventing and righting wrongful convictions is not shifted from the prosecution to the
defense. Otherwise, the dividends of undivided loyalty to clients,
preservation of their confidences, and protection of their right to
counsel will be lost.
The defense attorney embargoed from revealing the confidences of
her guilty client has been transformed into a safety valve for the government. The case against the innocent accused can proceed without
any knowledge that this exculpatory evidence exists, or when it does
come to light, with very little chance of it being admissible. But the
sanctum of the attorney-client relationship should not be breached to
remedy deficiencies in the justice system. The metrics of due process
and culpability are seldom black and white. This is why all prosecutions require heightened vetting and unencumbered post-conviction
good governments are founded upon essential equity, the sovereign authority will not
permit, so far as it can be prevented consistently with the maintenance of general
laws, injustice to be done." (emphasis added)).
272. See generally Thomas G. Frongillo & Daniel K. Gelb, It's Time to Level the
Playing Field - The Defense's Use of Evidence from Social Networking Sites, CHAMPION (Aug. 2010), http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/01cle7698280d2385256d0bOO78992
3/363336b5ff64b443852577c100550272 ("One of defense counsel's first tasks during an
investigation or case is to learn whether the client has used any social networking sites
and posted any harmful information on them. With the client's assistance, defense
counsel should review the information on the client's past and current social networking accounts."). Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and
ConstitutionalBoundaries, 31 Pace L. Rev. 228, 254 (2011)("Similarly, information
impeaching a witness or providing leads to exculpatory evidence might only be found
in unique places like Facebook or MySpace. Someone's online profile might be the
only place that an inconsistent statement or contradictory version of testimony can be
found, or even a confession pointing to someone else's guilt.").
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review, without reliance on a safety-valve that could undermine a
foundation of the justice system.27 3
The vexatious problems created by this scenario should be the
launching point for systemic reform. The impetus would lead to expanding the scope of post-conviction review, innocence courts, and
safe harbors for uncovering exculpatory evidence, without requiring
inculpation of the confessor or putting her counsel at risk of ethical
and civil liability. The confessor's rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, no less than the duties imposed on her attorney of loyalty and confidentiality instilled by the Rules of Professional Conduct,
dictate the need for added protections, such as transactional immunity, which will assure a constitutionally sanctioned flow of information. Due process demands that the innocence of an accused should
not be constrained by the ensigns of another attorney's relationship
with her client. And a criminal defense attorney, like a cleric, is in a
position to receive all of a client's secrets. But this privity does not
justify conscripting attorneys into the role of a whistleblower. It is a
delicate balance and the blurred lines left by Rule 1.6(b)(1) and current practices demand a clear approach that lifts the onus from defense counsel and the sacrosanct relationship as her client's advocate
and places it squarely on the justice system as a whole.
273. Justice Rehnquist in one decision wrote about the efficacy of executive clemency as a safety valve or "fail safe" for unjust convictions. See Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 415 (1993). This rationalized the refusal of the Court to accept freestanding
claims of innocence based on factual errors regardless of constitutional infirmities.
However, the anemic use of the pardon power demonstrates the fault in this approach. See Barkow, supra note 241, at 153.
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